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“Austerity has dramatically altered the geographies of everyday life” (Hitchen, 2019) 
The research studies how austerity frameworks affect the local scale of municipal public services 
in Puerto Rico. This thesis stems on one side from the passing of Hurricanes Irma and María in 
2017 which further revealed the vulnerability of the Puerto Rican archipelago and its people, and 
present the islands-territory as a particular case study.  Puerto Rico’s current status is framed by a 
persistent lack of economic development, unfolding financial decline and fiscal debt, a newly 
imposing oversight and management intervention by the United States, and an urgent need of 
post-disaster reconstruction–the question of public services becomes critical. The thesis formally 
asks, to what extent austerity impact public services delivery at a municipal level in Puerto Rico? 
The research argues that austerity strategies have translated to the municipal local level as fiscal 
discipline complicating the already intricate relation between central and local governments, as 
well as central and federal governments, exposing public and essential services to high 
uncertainty. There’s no evidence to protect and support municipal public services at any scale. 
The thesis argues that the body–and scale of local governance may be in the correct position to 
explore and foster planning practices that promote collaboration between the local and the 
central scale. The planning field largely allows for the articulation of public concerns, monitor 
metrics, mobilize discourses, and bridge a growing spatial inequality. The local scale delivery of 
public services– I would argue, can help guide the multiple agents–historical and present, to 





Figure 1. Puerto Rico archipelago and its 78 municipalities
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1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
This study is interested in the interactions between austerity measures, debt, equity, governance 
structures, and urban planning through investigating the public finances and the provisions of 
public services at a municipal level in the context of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico is a unique case 
study within the realm of the United States of America, including all its territories, since it 
incorporates multiple conditionings such as a persistence colonial ruling component which is 
“hidden” in the governance structure, economic stagnation, population loss, accelerated fiscal 
decline, debt, constant climate risk, all accounting for a vulnerability not always considered 
integral within a country’s planning landscape. The thesis asks, to what extent austerity impact 
public services delivery at a municipal level in Puerto Rico? 
Given that Puerto Rico is undergoing substantial restructuring, driven by major budget 
reductions mandated from the United States and its own central government as specify in the 
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA, 2016) moreover, 
the disruption that caused the passing of hurricanes Irma and María in 2017 underscore the need 
to inspect public services and the governing frameworks as a result of the adverse conditions and 
glooming implications over approximately 3.4M Puerto Ricans living in the island. The main 
driving force of this thesis is not just to understand a theoretical abstraction that comes with 
austerity and reconstruction but to devise alternative readings for a layered challenge that 
involves human impact. Since Puerto Rico finds itself under a massive post-disaster 
reconstruction that attempts to simultaneously institute a fiscal an economic restructuring, marks 
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a historical event that is pertinent to study with an urban and regional planning lens, 
acknowledging its limitation and challenges as this phenomenon is unraveling as this research 
takes place. 
1.1 Inquiring Public Services  
At the moment there is no explicit definition for essential services. No one in the governmental 
seats, in the Congress of the United States nor in the Financial Oversight and Management 
Board for Puerto Rico (FOMB) which was created under the PROMESA (2016) wants or prefer 
not to define what constitute essential services. It is even more uncertain, given the fiscal decline 
there is no predetermination of what gets cut and what doesn’t. However, given the context of the 
layered decisions and impacts to be made in respect to debt, future investment, reconstruction, 
and cutbacks, to be able to establish a strict definition should be further study. The creation of a 
strict definition for essential services can both increase or decrease the public services offered to 
the population. This creates, in consequence, an important void of knowledge that this thesis 
inquiries.  
For the scope of this research, we turn into looking closely at what are the established norms 
around public services in Puerto Rico. The research revealed that public services are firstly 
outlined by the Constitution of Puerto Rico (1952) and designated through State powers— 
referring to Puerto Rico’s central government responsibilities. The constitution specifically 
dictates that the government (P.R.) should guarantee all its citizens with the opportunity to have 
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all the essentials in life— this includes public education, security and the protection of life and 
property. It further establishes “[t]he right of everyone to enjoy a standard of living adequate for 
[itself] and [its] family health, welfare and especially food, clothing, housing, modest assistance 
and necessary social services.” Yet, in order to be able to fulfill these responsibilities, the central 
government has required throughout the years the support of the local municipal level 
governments without any written official mandate. This ambiguous zone of services offerings’ 
responsibilities creates one clear tension between the central–island wide versus the local 
municipal level governments. Municipalities are stated to have a more relevant role in public 
services delivery without any specific definition, the Ley de Municipios Autónomos 
(Autonomous Municipalities Law) of 1991 (Law No. 81 of 1991) became the only legal 
apparatus that contains a framework which a possible definition could be extrapolated. For this 
reason, public services are understood as the services that help sustain an improve a minimal 
quality of life of its citizens, particularly at the scale of its municipalities. However, the central 
government has the obligation for its role as main node for the island-wide support, and the 
municipalities are formally the second layer of governance emerging as local nodes with direct 
access to the diverse geographies and territories of the seventy eight municipal-cities. Public 
services are divided by the hierarchical layout between central and local governments. The 
divisions account for services ranging from public safety, health access, public works, welfare 
and education. These same services seem to be the ones that people consider important to them 
and determine the decision to continue in that community or more generally to live on a certain 
municipality. In order to secure a better quality of life it is crucial to consider these aspects. 
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Therefore, to begin addressing its complexity I would argue that since Puerto Rico has seventy-
eight municipalities, it is at the municipal level where the attention should be first placed. 
1.2 Municipalities at the Center of Local Level Governance 
"We reached the point where most municipalities simply do not have money to pay their debt. Everyone agrees 
with that, but the question that nobody dares to answer is what is next. Are municipalities eliminated? Do you 
choose to provide services at the regional level? We do not see any action in any direction”  
Retired Professor of Public Administration, Mario Negrón Portillo (Alvarado León, 2015). 
In order to comprehend Puerto Rico’s territory and to further understand the various geographies 
explored in this research, is important to highlight that it is composed of “la isla grande” (the big 
island) which is the main island and an archipelago that consists of several smaller islands and 
keys including two of them as municipalities, namely Vieques and Culebra. All municipalities 
range from been coastal, valley or mountain communities, both urban (including suburban) and 
rural. These multiple geographical conditions prevent the construction of a common baseline for 
comparison, furthermore, they vary not only in territory extension but also have diverse socio-
economic conditions. The municipalities political boundaries are in great part inherited by 
colonial legacies, they increased from six original municipalities as a Spanish colony to have 
seventy-eight municipalities as an American colony, these are the same until the present 
(Estudios Técnicos Inc., 2016). Yet, municipalities as localities have become important arenas for 
decision-making, their role has had a pendulum effect during Puerto Rico's planning and 
management of the urban fabric marking their importance as a study unit.  
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Municipalities are as suggested above a second layer of governance, and are subjected to the 
central government of Puerto Rico and the Federal laws of the United States. Currently, they 
have restricted levels of  “power,” as their local-level government is scrutinized by the United 
States and in tandem by its own central government. The municipal governments are caught 
between the lines of decentralized and centralized frameworks. With the adoption of the AMA in 
1991 (Law No. 81 of 1991) a significant change began in the way municipalities and the central 
government are related. Since then, the municipalities have acquired new responsibilities and 
powers but not all in equal form. However, the fiscal situation of the vast majority of the 
municipalities remain in an anemic economic state. It could be argued that the decentralization of 
Puerto Rico’s administrative system was promoted beforehand without a due planning 
development strategy and economic resources. The latter efforts have lost momentum and 
support within the last three years, undermining the importance of secondary actors and 
institutions by amplify centralization efforts. However, the volatile nature of economic and 
population activity in the municipalities generates the need for context-specific policies and 
geographically weighted decision even more relevant. Yet, depending on the stand point some 
will perceive them as the closest government level that its citizens have access to and others see 
them as “78 cash-hungry municipalities” (Alvarez, 2017).  
The basis of the vertical distribution of governmental power in Puerto Rico stems from the 
territory’s own constitution. The Puerto Rican Constitution defines the municipalities as a mere 
creature of the State (Section 1 Article VI of the Constitución de Puerto Rico). Nevertheless, 
“[h]istorically, the degree of autonomy granted to the municipalities has depended on the 
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economic, political and social circumstances of the time” (Ramos Gonzalez & Negrón Portillo, 
2008, p. 272). This “degree” has varied in great part because of who has governed the 
municipalities from the two main Puerto Rico’s political parties. The parties are defined by their 
position towards the island status towards the U.S., pro-status-quo versus pro-statehood. This 
sway have created unstable relations since the municipalities are either strongholds of one party 
or flipping territories. These circumstances reveal the critical importance of municipalities role 
and local governance models. Under this logic, exempting colonial reasoning, local governance 
should be defined as “inter, trans-, and nongovernmental formal and informal institutions, 
mechanisms and processes among states, markets, and organizations through which collective 
interests and approaches are negotiated” (Newell, Pattberg, & Schroeder, 2012, p. 369). This 
definition could start to make the case for the role of municipalities as a multi-actor domain. Are 
municipalities more nimble to provide services, collaborate, or a combination of compared to the 
capacities of the central government? 
The concurrent conditions of crises and disinvestment in Puerto Rico are overlapping 
phenomenons that have augmented within time by culminating in the extreme situation where 
Puerto Rico finds itself after September 20th of 2017–the passing of hurricane Maria.  The 
continual collection of mismanagement of resources at multiple levels of governance have a 
great impact around the political and economic opportunities of the territory. The faulty 
decisions have burdened the infrastructure, services and quality of life for the current and future 
population together with the country as a whole. It is important to recognize that although this 
thesis focuses on recent years, the current conditions are percolations of past decades. To 
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understand how Puerto Rico fell into the current economic situation it requires a historical 
perspective that will be outlined in the following section. 
1.3 A Snapshot of Puerto Rico’s Recent History 
In order to take into consideration Puerto Rico’s current economic situation it is imperative to 
consider it with historical perspective of the political conditions that shaped the island. The 
financial and economic crisis are results of decades of encroachments of economic growth by a 
lack of development strategy, and the complex historical geopolitical context of this American-
Caribbean territory, or possession. This has been complemented by decades of fiscal 
mismanagement palpable through rises in deficits, habitual over spending, high-debt in relation 
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), constant high rates of unemployment overplayed with a 
significantly low rate of higher education completion. 
Even if this may seem too far from today, Puerto Rico’s municipalities are to be understood since 
their formation as a colony of Spain. In the four hundred years under the Spanish ruling, Puerto 
Rico had limited development (road and infrastructure was hardly developed) given that the 
majority of Puerto Ricans live in extreme poverty situations highly dependent on agriculture as 
the main source of income (Picó, 2006, Chapter 12). The island was seen through the optic of its 
natural resources (land availability) which stimulated their needs of establishing cities across the 
island from coast to mountain, giving colonizers and new settlers the dream of their own domain. 
However, by the time of the Hispanic-American war Spain was not in shape to keep up their 
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colonies because of internal struggles during their Guerra de la Independencia Española, which 
facilitated the United States expanding imperialism over the Caribbean with a great interest in 
Cuba.  
In particular, Puerto Rico always remained as a shadow in the Hispanic Caribbean after Cuba 
and Dominican Republic (Scarano, 1993). With the Paris Treaty of 1898 Puerto Rico was ceded 
to the United States as token to the result of the war (Burnett & Marshall, 2001, pp. 104–117). 
An impoverished territory had been handed down to another colonial power. The United States 
took control over Puerto Rico with a military government, followed shortly by a U.S. imposed 
civil government (Burnett & Marshall, 2001, pp. 104–117). In 1917 the U.S. assigns U.S. 
Citizenship to the residents of the Puerto Rican archipelago, the existing Spanish citizenry could 
be maintained. The same year the Jones Act placed Puerto Rico under another U.S. law, that 
devised a triple tax-exempt territory for investors and business from the mainland, starting what 
would become decades of an economy of extraction (resources, social) or an “industrialization by 
invitation” (Collins, Bosworth, & Soto-Class, 2006) — a fact that still resonates today. During 
the first thirty years under United States ruling Puerto Rico developed its agrarian economy–
greatly the sugar industry, benefiting primarily the U.S. owners overpassing the local land 
owners (Dietz, 1992, pp. 127-128). Moreover, around 1930 “Puerto Rico was among the first 
buyers of the North American market becoming the third largest buyer in 1935” (Pérez Berg, 
2010, p. 60). Along these lines the development of the municipalities also started to reflect the 
uneven growth that was felt in the whole territory as part of the Great Depression and a 
struggling transformation from an agrarian into a forcibly industrialized society.   
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Around 1940’s Puerto Rico was based on a small agricultural economy with plenty of labor and 
underdeveloped land with very low capital. Back then, “[t]he basic idea was to exploit Puerto 
Rico’s advantages in a deglobalized world, namely, the ability to use the dollar as its currency, its 
cheap labor, its privileged duty-free access to the U.S. market, and its political stability to attract 
U.S. capital, match it with the excess pool of local labor, and export the resulting products to the 
United States, and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the world (Marxuach, 2018, pp. 2–3). This time 
marks a critical moment to the juncture between economy and planning in the context of Puerto 
Rico. In 1941 Rexford  G. Tugwell–an American economist who help craft Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s policies, is the last appointed  U.S. Governor of Puerto Rico after been the first 
Director of the New York City Planning Commission in 1938. Tugwell inspired much of the 
social and economic development programs established in Puerto Rico during the 1940s. In 1942 
he led the efforts to found the Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanization, and Zoning Board, commonly 
refer to as La Junta de Planificación. Tugwell’s intentions with this agency was to connect and 
have a more direct relation between economical measures and planning tools in order to gain 
more control of its territory, including the collection and analysis of data (Dietz, 1992, p. 205). 
Tugwell would use Puerto Rico as a terrain were to exert much more direct power that the one he 
intended in New York City a few years back. From this time onwards the Junta de Planificación 
became not only a centralized planning apparatus but a mechanism in which public money–
including public infrastructure and certain services, entered in dispute with the powers of the vast 
and dispersed municipalities. The centralized Junta de Planificación would oversee the whole 
archipelago territories. One of the purpose of this reform was to provide public services at 
!14
Calvesbert
reasonable costs (Dietz, 1992, p. 202). But exactly how this played out “on the ground” is not 
something we know too well . 
In 1952, Puerto Rico was officially constituted and formalized as the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. Thereupon, the Congress of the United States allowed the people of Puerto Rico to self-
organize a governmental body by locally electing the first Governor, Luis Muñoz Marín, who led 
the opportunity of creating a constitution of their own. This authorization resulted in the 
establishment of the “Estado Libre Asociado” which if translated directly doesn’t necessary 
dictated the status-quo, as it becomes misleading as an English term “Associated Free State.” 
The term “state” in the United States legal framework means one of the States of the Union, 
which is not the case for Puerto Rico. Two important facts of this event are worth noting; the first 
one is that shortly after the constitution was in place, the “United States asked the United Nations 
to take Puerto Rico off the United Nations Decolonization Committee's list of possessions over 
which its owner had to provide annual reports on efforts to decolonize” (Vidal, 2016, p. 7) 
officially leaving only Guam on the records (“The United Nations and Decolonization,” 2017). 
Second, a critical clause was entered in the Puerto Rico Constitution under Section 8 that 
stipulates the following, “in case the available revenues including surplus for any fiscal year are 
insufficient… interest on the public debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other 
disbursements shall thereafter be made…” In other words, and under very different conditions 
today, Puerto Rico must first pay its creditors (interest debt) before any public provision 
(including essential or public services), some aspects that are crucial to the understanding of the 
economical framework and their planning implementation that greatly shape the current 
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condition. After all, Puerto Rico and the United States still faces the political economic challenge 
of addressing the disparity ingrained in the social and fiscal landscape when compared to the 
mainland. These circumstances  about the complicated relationship between the United States 
and Puerto Rico are being discussed and litigated at the moment. The prolonged tension between 
the mainland and its territory is a legal matter and a major issue that needs to be critically 
assessed through the lens of several disciplines which history, economic development, and 
planning are a critical component. 
After been acknowledged as an unincorporated territory of the Unites States, Puerto Rico was 
able to jumpstart with a stronger economic model due to the colonial presence of the United 
States. However, it was until the late 1970’s after economic challenges started to arise. An 
economic incentive was implemented by the U.S. known as “U.S. Code § 936 - Puerto Rico and 
possession tax credit” commonly know as “Section 936.” This incentive subsidy pact devised 
growth around a few manufacturing industries with an elusive capital return that never generated 
the boost that was promised. It benefitted companies interested in establishing their business in 
Puerto Rico by relieving tax, and both produced and benefitted from local educated workforce. 
Section 936 lasted from 1976 to 1996 when it was phased out over a ten-year period until 2006. 
Yet, Puerto Rico never regenerated growth either in the industrial sector nor in smaller scale to 
offset the departure of the large foreign companies (Collins, Bosworth, & Soto-Class, 2006, p. 
110). This marked a critical juncture of Puerto Rico’s economic decline and lack of growth, 
leading to the current crisis in Puerto Rico as described by Juan Rafael Torruella, a First Circuit 
judge of the Court of Appeals (1994-2001), “the closing of the [tax] loophole in section 936 
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would have been sufficient to correct the abuses noted, Congress adopted a draconian solution 
and instead eliminated section 936 altogether” (Torruella, 2018, p. 91). This effort can be 
understood as actions and in-actions of the U.S. Congress, particularly during the 1996-2006 
phasing out process, along with the central government, where no other economic development 
strategy for Puerto Rico was put in place at the local or federal level. In other words, governance 
has also become a large factor in Puerto Rico of impeding or promoting innovative advancement 
notwithstanding that the Island has also lost the significant advantages in previous times. Within 
this time frame, in 1984, another critical measure was taken in the U.S. Congress. A low-key 
revision to the Section 9 of the Bankruptcy Code limited the definition of “state” with respect of 
defining who can be debtor which only include those of the Union excluding Puerto Rico from 
this legal framework and in turn alludes to the neo-colonial situation of the country (Joffe & 
Martinez, 2016, p. 16). Nonetheless, it is noted that the term “State” does not includes the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.  
The 1980s were marked by the reliance on Federal transfers, payments, grants and program, 
nevertheless, these federal expenditures have been key in sustaining vulnerable population as 
well as the contributing factor for the expansion of the public sector which currently has become 
the moving target as “collateral damage.” Additionally the availability of federal funds have 
become a latent factor for some of the failures of the inexistent growth path of Puerto Rico. As 
James Dietz claims that the “crisis of development model” and “Puerto Rico's growth path has 
been distinguished by an absence of planning (J. Dietz, 1982, p. 500). This backdrop formalized 
the normalization of installing frameworks that lack the mechanism to deal with the human 
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impact of the disjuncted governance and growth models. It clearly seems that Puerto Rico has 
needed a new planning approach for dealing with the lack of growth, economic deficit and ever 
growing dependencies. The lack of local funds and a stable economy for the population also 
causes that the country has become more recently a global tax haven. This condition was further 
highlighted between 2006-2016 by the persistent lack of development growth in combination 
with the unhealthy lending and borrowing habits that resulted into an unplayable debt in the 
following years. 
1.4 Puerto Rico’s Newer Context: PROMESA, Austerity, Post-Disaster Reconstruction 
These accumulating historical conditions have aggravated and unfolded onto a much complex 
one in 2016 when Puerto Rico’s public debt acquired a different dimension. The Puerto Rico’s 
government defaulted on their loans payments obligation, starting the ongoing deep crisis in 
which the territory is now said to be responsible for a $74B debt (about $24 billion is issued by 
municipalities). These totaling amounts suggest the municipalities’ role in issuing debt when 
compared to the total debt owed, a third of it, and the reversed condition the “central” debt had 
on them, this is, tied hands in advancing their local agendas and needs. 
In June 2016 the United States Congress and President Barack Obama intervened in Puerto Rico 
by imposing an external structure, know as the Financial Oversight and Management Board 
(“FOMB”), to exercise federal oversight over the fiscal affairs of the Caribbean territory. The 
enactment of PROMESA created a unique set of bankruptcy procedures awakening the ultimate 
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decision of 1984 that leaves Puerto Rico without the option of exercising  bankruptcy (Chapter 
9) which uprooted the fiscal limbo. Despite the already established limited options PROMESA 
allowed the creation of instruments for Puerto Rico to re-establish a debt commitment and regain 
access to the capital markets. The adherence to these debt restructuring instruments–many been 
formalized as this text is written, greatly determine the impact it will have in at least 40 years in 
the decreasing 3.4 million individuals that live on the island. PROMESA’s intricacy in part is that 
this single intervention forcefully holds authority over the island’s governing system in terms of 
financial plans, legislatives actions and governance reforms. This takeover has a trickle-down 
effect that starts at a federal level and concludes in impacting the living conditions of its citizens 
and generations to come, particularly in health, education, and what is been discussed as public 
services. 
PROMESA dictates an implementation strategy that is established through an undetermined 
timeframe with a multi-year “Fiscal Plan” produced by the local government that serves as an 
“enforcement tool for the Oversight Board to ensure accountability in the territory and its 
institutions” (An Overview of PROMESA’s Major Provision & Key Refinements, 2018). This 
Fiscal Plan should determine a long-term approach to eliminate deficits and establishes punctual 
reforms which eventually would repair the struggling economy of the islands. This “enforcement 
tool” is prepared by de central government of Puerto Rico yet it has to be approved by the 
FOMB in order to ensure that the local government’s future spending habits, legislatives 
practices and debt restructure follow the recovery strategy (Austin, 2016). Despite this logical 
approach to devise a formal structure to deal with Puerto Rico’s debt crisis mixed with lack of 
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economic growth— a remarkably complex scenario, has not resulted in a mutually agreeable 
task. Even though the Fiscal Plan attempts to coordinate the local government with the FOMB to 
seek approval by the U.S. Congress, it has resulted in the contrary, there have been many 
disagreements as each side struggles to install their own vision of the island’s fiscal and 
operational affairs in general. Nevertheless, such issues had become unattended or even salient 
the first years. More recently they became evident since it has upbeat conflicts between residents, 
local governmental actors against the seven members of the FOMB. These tension spur a 
historical wave of unstoppable marches against the imposition of the FOMB that took over 
public streets, official events, created infinites campaigns and has motivated a political will that 
seemed to be dormant all these years of U.S. imperial treatment in the island as well as for the 
Puerto Rican diaspora. 
Additionally, the fiscal plan of 2017-2018 enacts the reduction and cuts in government spending 
in such important areas as public sector, health, education and security with the theory of “right-
sizing” the government posing threat to basic services to the detriment of an already vulnerable 
population. This plan is the driving force of further accelerating the austerity measures 
philosophy over Puerto Rico and is suitable to inquire how can this political process lead to fair 
and just policies, planning practices and thrive in the context of Puerto Rico? 
The ultimate result was that this single plan had in 2017-2018 multiple iterations, despite the 
close door policy practices and a non-existent public information session or forum marking the 
asymmetric power installed by PROMESA. Furthermore, Federal "supremacy" is established in 
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its Section 4 over the Puerto Rican territory given that “[PROMESA] will prevail over any 
general or specific provision of territorial law, state law, or regulation that is inconsistent with the 
bill” (Austin, 2016, p. 10). By creating this supremacy clause it gives the power of subjugating 
the central government to a second-class administrator position that requires to report to the 
FOMB, clearly evidencing its colonial subjugation and lack of sovereignty. This power is in 
place despite the fact that Puerto Rico’s debt has not been audited, and both local and federal 
governments have avoided doing so further expanding the challenges and limitations of this 
study. 
But these is not all the recent events affecting the definition, protection, and implementation of 
public services in the context of Puerto Rico. When the hurricanes Irma and Maria made a 
direct landfall on the island the fiscal plan was not agreed upon and the FOMB used 
discretionary power for approval even though the central government did not agree on all that 
was requested. The “unnatural” disaster started to unfold. The FOMB spearheaded 
contractionary measures in order to reduce Puerto Rico’s government “expenses” to pay the debt, 
while the devastation of the hurricanes was just starting to reveal the dire conditions that have 
been hidden–or not attended for decades. 
Puerto Rico was hit by one of the most devastating hurricanes in the territory’s history breaking 
records even in mainland U.S.. As per the Center for Puerto Rican Studies study’s release on 
October 2018, “Hurricane Maria represents many firsts in U.S. history: the longest sustained 
domestic air mission of food and water response, the largest disaster commodity distribution 
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commission, the most expansive sea-bridge operation of federal disaster aid, and the biggest 
disaster generator installation mission. In addition, Maria constitutes one of the largest disaster 
medical response and housing operations in U.S. history.” (Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 
2018, p. 2).  The whole archipelago of Puerto Rico suffered from a lack of effective and 
immediate response to the catastrophe, with shared responsibilities from the central government 
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The islands experienced full black-out 
for months (Robles, 2018). The death toll product of the hurricanes passing extended to 
thousands which state agencies under-reported and then highly questioned alternative sources 
and parallel studies (Milken Institute School of Public Health, 2017). The health centers had 
been heavy damaged losing access and capacity to care for needed patients. Almost all of the 
island’s infrastructure was slashed provoking disconnection at all levels. Moreover, the 
preexisting lack of social services including declining pensions, police, fire service and closed 
schools are consistently threatening local capacity to respond from communities to institutions 
(“Meeting Coverage,” 2018). Rebuilding Puerto Rico requires significant financial investment, 
and the region’s local economies in addition to it fiscal capacity are almost not existent at this 
point.
Above all, Puerto Rico has been known as the “emptying island” at multiple times in history as 
writer Frances Negrón-Muntaner presents in her articled tilted The Emptying Island Puerto Rican 
Expulsion in Post-María Time pointing out that population loss has been a generalized crisis 
from decades (Negrón-Muntaner, 2019). This situation could be further traced back to the 
decades of the early 1900’s when the United States assigned citizenship to Puerto Ricans. As a 
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result, one year after the hurricane nearly 160,000 islanders have relocated to the United States 
(Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 2018, p. 4). In other words, Puerto Rico has a fluctuation of 
population from its early years but it did not accounted the above mentioned circumstances. 
Nonetheless it is important to ask, what kind of population is being lost? Puerto Rico has had a 
steady decreased in population throughout the last twelve years. It has been registered that in 
2006 the population totaled around 3.8 million and in 2018 3.2 million, this will directly impact 
not only public services provision but also will become a driving narrative for the restructuring 
along with the reconstruction efforts; including the reconsideration of land use and planning in 
the context of enhancing the existing communities and their surrounding built environment. 
Public services will be crucial to sustain this. 
All of these critical conditions mentioned in this historical snapshot frames Puerto Rico again 
under a tightly oppressed scenario: lack of economic development and growth, financial debt, an 
unprecedented disaster recovery in addition to the lack of official communication or participation 
channel for the residents to advocate, informed themselves, or participate in any of the 
restructuring process. This has generate on one hand a lot of public opposition, the persistence of 
mass protests, demonstrations and local campaigns to seek a fair and transparent process to 
ensure equitable conditions for all the Puerto Ricans. On the other hand a vast amount of the 
population keeps going with their daily lives as better as they can, either because they have the 
privilege to do so, or because they are unaware of how political powers will affect their lives in 
their hasty struggle of having two-three jobs. 
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2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
The overarching question of this study is, to what extent austerity impact public services delivery 
at a municipal level in Puerto Rico?. This question will be asked in the context of economic 
distress, debt restructuring, post-disaster, and a critical–hidden in plain sight colonial ruling. To 
further explore this question this research will consider the existing protocols and mechanisms 
that manifest and reflect the economical austerity measures in the spatial, social and political 
context of Puerto Rico’s municipalities. It investigates how Puerto Rico is taking decisions 
regarding its budget restructuring for securing the financing and implementation of public 
services, with the limited information available and the reality that this situation is currently 
unfolding. 
I hypothesize that shifts in public services delivery stem from Puerto Rico's unique colonial 
conditions structured within legal frameworks, financial crisis, along with the increasingly 
vulnerability condition as a result of its geographical location. Consequently, the lack of certain 
explanations, evidence and accountability either through data collection or by officially pointing 
out responsible actors for the fiscal crisis gives space to understand that this precise 
reconstruction is taken for granted context-specific challenges. The narrative of a period needed 
for “right-sizing” is disputable.  
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2.1 Why This Matter for Urban Planning? 
At a global scale it’s predicted that weak economic growth will persist and shifts in capital flows 
will keep threatening poverty reduction causing disruptive changes in our living standards, social 
behaviors, lifestyle, health access, and education. “Growing  global connectivity amid a weak 
growth will increase tensions within and between society”(The National Intelligence Council 
(NIC), 2016). The need for extra funding to seek preparedness and reconstruction marks the 
pertinence of interdisciplinary planning practices in concert with the continuation of climate 
change and extreme weather lashing multiple landscapes forcing vulnerability into society. Even 
more now that the United States’ formulations of fiscal policies at multiple scales are engaging in 
major spending cuts and private tax incentives that will result in disparaging results for the 
planning field and beyond. Ultimately, a fiscal ambiguity where budget cuts and consolidations 
become the norm simultaneously overspills from economics to political boundaries and overlays 
itself onto social and spatial frontiers. Yet, waiting for another extreme event to unfold in order to 
address structural issues can have significant downsides. It can be argued that governmental 
officials since the 1990s have increasingly adopted an indirect role in managing, contracting, 
regulating and de-regulating public agencies or private markets, instead of offering direct 
services.  
It is precisely under this current and yet to come conditions that more planners and specifically 
Puerto Rican planners will find themselves practicing as citizens, public servants, consultants 
and scholars. As critical planners facing austerity politics the discipline allows the articulation of 
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concerns, monitoring measurements, mobilize discourses and practices to revoke growing 
welfare and disparities gaps—along with growing spatial inequality. Moreover planners hold the 
potential to install equity and social responsibility in a greater extent. Posing the challenge if 
wether the planning field can take a proactive leadership upon this “new normal” of scarcity and 
economic and environmental volatility? 
The importance of understanding the state of politics furthermore the conditions of economy 
cannot be underestimated when it comes to urban planning practices. Austerity has become a 
trait in the United States even before the 2008 financial crisis, as a by-product came restructuring 
and budgeting reductions as common practice among cities, municipalities, states and the federal 
government (Peck, 2012). Most often framing cities and in the case of Puerto Rico, the 
municipalities as isolated fiscal entities that must endure and take almost individual 
responsibility along with been accountable as private actors, similarly to financial markets.  
 Urban planning as a field guides the preparation through policy and the design of the built 
environment, the hardest implications of economic distress as they impact cities, analyses for 
public services management and delivery to be taken into account in the planning processes that 
are informed by or in response to those conditionings. Political economy forces are a critical 
factor in how local systems have developed and perform. Planning, both in general and with 
respect to public service could cover a vast landscape, since it involves connecting multiple 
scales of government, administration, bottom-up efforts in concert with complex and ambiguous 
laws as well as practices installed in the existing context. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research question is situated between the literature review of Austerity, Public Services, 
Fiscal Crisis and Reconstruction. However due to the context-specific conditions that Puerto 
Ricos finds it self, this literature speaks to general trends only. 
3.1 Austerity  
Austerity is more than a concept; it is a package of measures and policies to be implemented in a 
multi-scalar form that needs to be interrogated since multiple scholars have already exposed the 
problematics of this framework (Baruphakēs, 2018; Blyth, 2013; Haughton & Hincks, 2013; 
Schui, 2014). Mark Blyth (2013) claims that austerity is a “dangerous idea” stating two main 
arguments; that it doesn’t work in practice since the final outcome shrinks the economy for 
everyone and the approach don’t turned out quite as planned. The second shortcoming 
establishes these measures rely on the poor population paying for mistakes of the rich. Along 
those lines the author further explains that “austerity rest upon the absence of a large fallacy of 
composition”. In other words what is true for the whole is not always true for the parts— even 
though it can be statistically true it can also be empirically meaningless. 
Jaime Peck (2012) adds to the austerity concept the theme of urbanism to highlight the role of 
urban politics and local governance. He describes that the city becomes a battleground between 
austerity policies and the spatial needs of the urban realm. In this sense, austerity urbanism is a 
powerful driver of ‘rollback’ governance as an active destruction of social-needs or services at 
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large. Further more, Fuller (2017) also describes austerity as an important feature of urban 
society something that has been engraved since the 2008 crash and its legacy will stay. 
Moreover, he claims that Western countries are both sites of crisis tendencies of capitalism and 
also as spaces trying to mitigate austerity programs initiated by their own nation states conditions 
that directly relates to the Caribbean context. 
Under a regime of generalized austerity in Puerto Rico with the private and mostly the public 
sector being restructured at the same time, there is limited room for growth and spending 
management.  
3.2 Public Services 
The condition of austerity marks the importance of studying public services since the 
management directly impacts the delivery of those same services that have direct and strong 
consequences in the distribution, arrangement, and production of space at the formal, social, and 
political level (Lippi & Tsekos, 2019). Even though Lippi and Tsekos (2019) focus on the 
Mediterranean European context, they signal the importance of studying austerity in relation to 
public service provision. Their research reflects that this relationship has often been neglected by 
scholars in favor of its economic. They counteract this tendency by establishing that public 
services are a good lens through which to consider the social impact in the center/periphery 
(government and governance scales) in relation to (reductions of autonomy, upscaling, 
recentralization) the process of a crisis and fiscal consolidation. 
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3.3 Fiscal Crisis 
Fiscal Crisis generates the context for austerity to be implemented or conceived, this literature 
also plays a critical role in understanding the sparking products and motivators of contractionary 
measures. James O’Connor is highly related to the term fiscal crisis within the field of urban 
political economy because of his book The Fiscal Crisis of the State. He frames fiscal crisis 
under the idea that federalism, suburbanization, institutional fragmentation and the rise of the 
welfare state are a set of disparate problems (O’Connor, 1973). He also points out that while 
“capital accumulation is possible (it must also) try to maintain or create the conditions for social 
harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces help one class accumulate capital 
at the expenses of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines its basis of 
support”(O’Connor, 1973, p.7).  In other words, a fiscal crisis is the source of a growing 
'structural gap’ between State revenues and expenditures that “further leads to economic, social, 
and political crises.” Additionally and in more equivalent terms to Puerto Rico, Mark Blyth 
questions “why we mistakenly call this a sovereign debt crisis when in fact is a transmuted and 
well-camouflaged bank crisis” (Blyth, 2013) since the canonical fiscal crisis is a debt crisis of 
banks. 
3.4 Reconstruction  
Reconstruction is not something that this study analyzes, yet is taken into consideration as a 
condition given the impact of Hurricane Irma and María in 2017. As Thomas J. Campanella and 
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Lawrence J. Vale (2005), scholars that have confronted this topic head on, established that 
“resilience involves more than rebuilding and that urban recovery occurs network by network, 
district by district.” Additionally, its core efforts situates around the social relations embedded in 
schools, workplaces, children care, local places, and recreation sites, these locale are the same 
ones being targeted to cut or are in declining state in Puerto Rico; and in a more severe condition 
at a municipal level. Furthermore, Campanella (2006) claims that recovery and reconstruction 
are difficult when the efforts are imposed from outside without the local participation, also a 
recurring tension in Puerto Rico. Reconstruction funding come mostly from FEMA funds that are 
then trickle-down to a series of companies and organizations that filter the resources in multiple 
steps until it arrives in the form of blue-tarp first, and perhaps in the form of cinder block later. 
Outsourcing companies or hiring foreigners to solve the islands local problems have become the 
norm that hinders the possible transformations via a historic recovery period into attainable 
local-led growth (Lamba-Nieves & Santiago-Bartolomei, 2018).  In addition to contributing to 
local growth Katy Wright speaks about the shortcoming of not having an inclusive process. She 
establishes that developing resilience and emergency planning will not be successful if there is a 
lack of commitment towards the "collective social, economic and environmental security,” in 
other words, efforts will not suffice if they do not consider public and essential services, 
economic growth models and climate risk coupled with environmental priorities (Wright, 2016, 
p. 155). Her focus derives from the need to insert the human impact consequences at the 
forefront of the reconstruction period and the center of any new effort. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
For asking the question of, to what extent austerity impact public services delivery at a municipal 
level in Puerto Rico? this research aims to point out the protocols and mechanism that manifest 
in austerity programs within the context of Puerto Rico in order to discuss further implications of 
austerity measures on public services at the municipal level. Puerto Rico’s colonial condition, 
population loss, post-disaster reconstruction and new-old governance scheme poses economic 
and fiscal challenges that defy possible comparison with any other State of the Union. For this 
reason this study takes in consideration some of Puerto Rico’s data/documents at Federal (USA), 
National (PR) and Local (Municipal) scale in order to discuss austerity measures impact at a 
municipal level. Recognizing that the tension between austerity and public services is an ongoing 
phenomenon, and that the research deals with a “moving target,” the acquired strategy is an 
iterative process that followed the theory for a spiraling research approach (Figure 2). Berg 
(2009) demonstrates that research can function in a non-linear scheme and such a process allows 
for a more flexible search of literature, data and contacts in accordance to changes or new 
findings.   
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The research also focuses on mixed-methods to avoid missing significant information as it 
allows ample ways to obtain different aspects of the same phenomenon in its context. It can be 
argue that by combining methods into a mixed-method research provides planning investigators a 
more comprehensive understanding than would not be possible under a single method (Creswell, 
2014). On this basis the study picks four non-sequential explorative phases (Figure 3) having 
qualitative analysis always at the foreground and only where the quantitative builds on the results 
of the qualitative findings. The latter being for the four municipalities that where further explored 
by financial, socioeconomic and public services delivery (in the years 2012-2018) in addition it 
serves a way to confirm the general trends mentioned on the official documents and in some 
interviews. 
Based on the qualitative part the research describes the evolving framework of the contractionary 
measure, commonly known as reduction of government expenses to pay the debt of Puerto Rico 
and their layered implications within the perspective of urban planning, local governance and 
!32
Figure 3. Mixed-method research four non-sequential explorative phases approach diagram
Calvesbert
economic & community development. The consulted data focuses on the years between 2012 
and 2018 given the scope and time of the research. The considered sources range from local 
press, journals and academic articles, to Puerto Rico’s new policy documents, municipal 
financial reports— Single Audits for Aguada, Adjuntas, Cayey and Toa Baja, in combination 
with socio economic governmental data sets–all which were publicly available. Additionally, 
nine semi-structured and open ended interviews were done during a two week visit to Puerto 
Rico along with casual visits to multiple municipalities in January 2019. The four phases 
considered in this research design are: (1) policy, report and plan documents, (2) semi-structure 
& opened interviews, (3) analysis & visualization of socio-economic data, and (4) analysis & 
visualization of municipal financial data. Each one of the methods previously described will be 
presented bellow with their respective findings. Despite that the research methods will be 
presented separately, this research is based on the triangulation of data and findings which 
allowed a further understanding of the sample study of four municipalities along with different 
scales (Figure 4). All these sources provided findings and opportunities as well as challenges and 
limitations that will be discussed after explaining each framework. 
4.1 Phase 1: Policy documents, Reports, Plans and Municipal Financial Reports 
The first phase analysis involved rigorous reading, taking notes and identifying actors while 
specifically looking at how the narrative of debt, services and municipalities are addressed in 
policy plans and reports that stemmed out of the fiscal crisis and the path of the hurricanes. The 




Puerto Rico 2018 is considered the “blueprint of the reforms and fiscal measures” for an 
“effective and efficient public sector.” Additionally, in reference of the passing hurricanes, the 
Government of Puerto Rico seeks to transform the island’s condition by increasing resiliency for 
“future disasters, and turn around the economic decline through a plan, Transformation and 
Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto 
Rico. These documents were analyzed and cross referenced with each other and allowed to gauge 
austerity presence and construct the base of Puerto Rico’s new leadership, the FOMB and the 
U.S. Congress as critical players. 
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4.2 Phase 2: Semi-Structure & Open Ended Interviews 
The next in order were the nine open ended and semi-structured interviews focusing on local 
officials, public sector planners, experts, academics, and non-profit organizations. The purpose of 
the interviews was to build up on the already gathered information about existing plans in order 
to better understand the priorities related to public services in terms of its management, local 
institutions and municipal processes. The first set of questions were prepared based on the 
revisions and information from the report section and afterwards the questions were modify 
according to any gaps, observation, or unique knowledge that the interviewee could potentially 
provide. Since the interviews were semi-structured, the questions led to an open conversation 
and free response yielding valuable information based on their expertise and experience. By 
gathering multiple perspectives it helped develop further understanding of what are the impacts 
on public services delivery while adding a more nuanced understanding that could devise key 
municipalities to study more in detail. 
All interviews were conducted in Spanish and their duration ranged from half an hour to over 
one hour. It started by a short introduction of myself and the purpose of the research followed by 
each interviewee telling me about themselves, its professional or academic background and their 
years of experience or working in the field. All conversation where cross reference with local and 
international press since many of the conditions mentioned are current and unfolding. The 
following table (Table XX) represents the interviewed  subjects with the exception of various 
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individuals from NGOs and former high-rank government officers who have asked to remain 
anonymous. 
 
4.3 Phase 3: Socio-Economic Data Analysis 
It is crucial to recognize some of the socio-economic features at play in the seventy-eight 
municipalities that form Puerto Rico. This phase shows general trends found in both national and 
municipal level data provided by the Oficina del Contralor de Puerto Rico (OCPR). This 
exploration process of acquiring data underpins the underdevelopment state in which the digital 
governance stands. The island is extremely behind in processing and allowing access to data 
when compared to the mainland. It is laborious to get specific information even though that is 
known to be publicly available. However given the topic at hand, austerity and public services 
and the uneasiness around data this study is based on data provided by OCPR called Banco 
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Central Municipal in english Municipal Central Bank. This dataset is a time series data 
(2003-2017) collected from the municipalities at a national level which then was formatted in an 
Excel document with multiple sheets (tabular data). Given what was provided and the research  
question only the following sets were taken into consideration (1) Population data, (2) Excess 
(surplus) of income over fiscal year expenses and the deficiency (deficit) in the closing of the 
fiscal year, (3) Municipal public debt, according to the former B.G.F. These sets will permit to 
triangulate economic and fiscal deficits with the socio economic situation of each municipality. 
The goal with the select set was to be able to revise answered questions, pointing gaps and even 
advancing any understanding for particular municipalities—always in relation with the previous 
phases. Also, to analyze at a larger scale (all municipalities) to pinpoint which municipality 
should be pick to further analyze their services delivery. In the data science field this process is 
called exploratory data analysis (EDA) were researcher unsubscribes to the empiricist notion of  
“the data speaks” and is more about having an open attitude to see what the dataset provides and 
where it overlaps with other formats of research. Specifically, it was done as a way to counteract 
some level of confirmation bias since it was difficult to obtain a clear-cut answer from a not-so-
open topic as it results to be for public services and austerity. Although the exploratory 
characteristic of EDA offers a variety of techniques the most suitable was the graphic 
explorations given that it maximized insights into each dataset, allowed to extract important 
variables, detect outlier and anomalies at a municipal level. Not all the explorations are included 
in this study however the following were some outputs done: simple arithmetic between 
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columns, plotting the raw data, simple statistic such as means and standard deviations, 
organizing them by amount & region, and cross referencing it with the rest of the given sets. 
4.4 Phase 4: Municipal Financial Data (Single Audits Reports) 
Single Audits (SA) became the main data source for hypothesis testing given that neither federal, 
central or local government have performance or evaluating data for public services delivery in 
Puerto Rico. Also, considering the literature review in combination with the previous phases 
austerity protocols in the island are being enforced by rolling back on economic factors like 
budget, expenses, and appropriations in order to reduce “overspending” aligning in a theoretical 
form with the inquiry and the purpose of this types of report. The SA are audit reports enacted as 
a streamlined process that aims to improve effectiveness and reduce the audit burden of central 
and local government by assuring rigorous financial statements.  
These financial audits are performed annually in a strict timely regime. SA must be submitted 
within 30 days after audit reports are done or 9 months after the fiscal year ended—in Puerto 
Rico the fiscal year ends on June 30th. SA as a financial performance report provided an 
overview of the municipalities fiscal activities. All major individual funds and expenses are 
presented in the document and evaluated in detail in relation to the past year by the chosen 
accountant. The municipalities account for their cost (~starting price approximately $2,000) and 
coordination in order to comply with the Federal Government Auditing Standards, issued by the 
Comptroller General of the United States and a Federal Law Single Audit Act. SA are publicly 
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available documents that allow a range of actors from residents to government official to address 
relevant questions or gain detailed information about their hometown.  
SA can be understood as a tool that records all the fundings received from higher levels in a 
combination of other municipal financial sources. Since the local financial statements are under 
the responsibility of each Mayor, it thus serve as a reflection of its own accountability on their 
services and a way to gauge their role in governance in economic and legal terms. Afterward, 
these reports get submitted to the central government where the rest of the finances get carried on 
to the national scale, resulting in a second internal way of economic oversight. It serves as 
internal and external management for all municipal spending as reports are then used to 
extrapolate monetary information.  
This phase uses the single audit reports to delineate two major factors: (1) Identify what are the 
public services delivered in all the municipalities and which are the services most common to 
establish equal relationships. (2) What has been the impact on the services in relation to 
monetary shifts conceptualizing that without proper funding services are at stake given the rising 
level of uncertainty. 
SA is the only audited documents that permitted a time series exploration at the municipal scale 
were public services could be traced by only focus on the Activity Statements section. The 
financial dataset had to be reconstructed in excel by the author since documents are only 
available in PDF. A new table was formatted that integrated the activity statements for 
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2012-2017. Another table was made taking into consideration all seventy-eight municipalities’ 
listed services to then filter out the reputed services and yield the range of services that at least in 
2012 where offered. Additionally, the PDF documents allow making an inference with other 
financial activities from the municipalities, however, this study only took into consideration the 
specific area of the schedule of expenditures for public services called Activity Statements. The 
use of SA allowed to capture a snapshot of expenses/revenues and compare them numerically to 
measure the changes between years.  
The Activity Statements section presents the three main areas of municipal revenues: Program 
Revenue, General Revenue, and Expenses. Program Revenue present charges for services, fees, 
licenses and permits; operating grants which include operating-specific and discretionary (either 
operating or capital) grants; and capital grants which are capital-specific grants. General 
Revenues include all taxes that the municipalities use to operate; property tax are recognized as 
revenues in the year for which the taxes are levied, Municipal license taxes are recorded as 
revenues in the period the Municipality has an enforceable legal claim and time requirements are 
met; sales and use taxes (IVU) are recognized as revenues in the period when the underlying 
exchange has occurred. The Municipality's expenses cover a range of public services and also 
includes the interest on long term debt. By analyzing the tendency between revenues and 
expenditure during established years it is possible to examine the balancing act being done 
locally in order to keep the system operating. The analysis only focused on the SA of four 
municipalities as they became available, Adjuntas, Aguada, Cayey and Toa Baja (Figure 5). 
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4.5 Why Municipal Single Audits for: Cayey, Adjuntas, Aguada & Toa Baja 
Given the time that this research is done daily changes were happening in Puerto Rico regarding 
the topic. This constrained the control between choosing and deeply analyzing all 78 
municipalities since OCAM, the central agency that holds the data of the municipal expenses 
shutdown their website on February 13, 2017, and no other agency had access to this 
information. This lead to an unavoidable reduction in scope as of the available data. Despite that 
Aguada, Adjuntas, Cayey and Toa Baja where the only complete sets of reports from 2012-2017 
that were managed to be provided in a timely manner they served as an appropriate sample. 
Referencing previous phases and as result of the iterative approach, these four municipalities 
exhibit a variety of conditions that municipalities bear in relation to public services the most 
important are (1) geographic location, (2) debt position, and (3) budgetary production. 
Notwithstanding other difference as political affiliations, levels of poverty, amount of population, 
the total area of territory, other presence of economic development and their relation to the path 












This thesis focuses on the ongoing phenomenon of austerity and the impact to public services at 
a municipal level in Puerto Rico a topic that is unraveling as the research took place adding 
pertinent value for the effort as well as challenges and limitations. The identification of strategies 
to address this moving target became an iterative process which included four exploratory phases 
in order to devise and grasp this austerity regime considering the specific context of fiscal 
decline, post-disaster reconstruction, and colonial legacy. Therefore, there is a possibility that as 
time passes the complexity of the layered relationship gets clarified, other data comes available 
or even further studies are published. However, at this moment, there is a shortage of 
publications in regards to the topic and the region at large. 
The methodologies included are a reflection of the timeframe given for the study yet further 
research could consist with the same strategy and could be open to including all municipalities 
and 2017-2018 reports released at the moment this research ended. However, the presented 
methodology would be hard to replicate since it is heavily based on qualitative data that only 
managed to set and identify some of the resources and mechanisms behind the municipal 
debacle. Therefore, is highly recommended that spatial analysis is embedded in future research. 
The collection of governmental data in Puerto Rico is another topic that should be further 
investigated as is out of this research scope but confirms taking into consideration the laborious 
work spent on this study. However, it is important to highlight that Puerto Rico recently is 
expanding their digital governance strategies and policies causing more alertness when searching 
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for specific data sets and underpinning another possibility where the field of urban planning 
could be involved recognizing the history of Puerto Rico’s Planning Board goals. Furthermore, 
the precariousness of the data collection and availability of truth-worthy analysis is a 
combination of a limitation as well as a finding. This marks and raises general concerns about the 
decision-making process unfolding at the moment. 
In regards to public services given that they are not a homogenous sector between municipalities 
even though they are governed by the same legal structures implores further research. While this 
study was able to conclude with limited multi-scale understanding things will only get more 
challenging perhaps for this thesis to address but with a proper investigation could be useful to 
device other possible paths of actions for municipalities and communities in general. Along these 
lines, this study only marks the beginning of a more complex part of a systemic configuration of 
economic, social, and political aspects that are embedded into public services and planning. 
Lastly, the uneasiness for communicating, holding interviews and sharing information could be 
representative of the bigger tension around the topic. Perhaps indicates and highlight the stress 
levels that the public sector finds itself and at the same time could suggest a general power 
asymmetry that governmental bodies have with its Puerto Rican citizens, which in turn raises 
transparency and participation as another critical issue. Following relevant issues that weren't 
answered in this study but identified there needs to be further research about: how the austerity 
measures are, if any, strictly formulated and what information is needed to implement them if 
they were the only options? 
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5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Phase 1: PROMESA, FOMB and Restructuring 
The intervention of U.S. Congress highlighted already existing problems that the island is 
historically dragging— economic competitiveness and financial performance. The Oversight 
Board mission is to achieve the re-entry of Puerto Rico into the financial (borrowing) market. As 
described in the official website it establishes that "is tasked with working with the people and 
Government of Puerto Rico to create the necessary foundation for economic growth and to 
restore opportunity to the people of Puerto Rico” (“About Us,” 2016). This statement unscrews a 
debatable structural process regarding FOMB’s authoritative power enacted by PROMESA. How 
much power should be given to unelected individuals that result in a supra-government? Given 
that the FOMB was created due to the insufficient governance and fiscal transparency, for this 
same reason, it allows them to have “sole discretion” to certify, review, approve, call to action on 
top of the central government of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the governing document becomes the 
fiscal plan serving as the guidelines to inform future decisions of all governing actors (1) Central 
government, (2) Municipal government and (3) FOMB included.  
Is highly questionable that “working” together is part of the FOMB goals as mention through 
interviews and local press there is high levels of lack of alignment between FOMB and central 
government. Moreover, the cause of the islands indebtedness could be factored by Federal 
rollbacks and weak fiscal governance on both levels, Federal and National. 
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5.2 Phase 1: The Fiscal Plan and Enforcement Mechanisms 
The Fiscal Plan “provides a blueprint of the reforms and fiscal measures that will give Puerto 
Ricans an effective and efficient reliable public sector” (Fiscal Plan For Puerto Rico, 2018, p. 7). 
This plan will devise the government's finances for the next five years and set the development 
strategies and priorities for Puerto Rico to re-enter the financial market in order to obtain 
sustainable governing practices. In the words of Martín Guzmán, a Research Associate at 
Columbia University Graduate School of Business, "the fiscal plan apparently models the 
hurricane as a positive net shock ... In spite of the importance of knowing the assumptions on 
which the fiscal plan is based in order to evaluate adequately its economic and social impact, the 
plan is not transparent and does not reveal its central assumptions” (“Tribunal falla en favor de 
Espacios Abiertos en pleito sobre Plan Fiscal,” 2018). This official document by itself has had 
around nine iterations published and a new one is being hatched. The first three versions were 
prepared by the administration of former Governor Alejandro García Padilla (PPD) as a result of 
declaring a state of fiscal emergency in the summer of 2014. The remaining six have been 
devised by the current Governor administration, Ricardo Rosselló, statehood supporter (PNP). It 
is important to acknowledge that both main political parties are “status” oriented and not 
exclusive, in both of them their members can belong or identify with either the Republican Party 
or the Democratic Party of mainland U.S.. Although the total cost of preparing this fiscal plan 
has not been officially reported by the executive, the contracts of the advisors working to 
produce the plan now amount to more than $90 million according to a search conducted by the 
Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (CPI, Center for Investigative Journalism). This “power 
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grab” has also an extra cost to Puerto Rico. In 2016 the FOMB had a $30 million budget and 
after the hurricane it has requested a new increase budget totaling $100 million. 
The plan contemplates a series of initiatives of transformation in government agencies, and 
economy that would generate more than $3 million in savings. Some of the changes at a national 
level include the reorganization of the Departments of Education, Correction (Prison), and 
Health. More specifically, even though the government of Puerto Rico acknowledges that the 
island is treated unequally under key programs such as Medicaid, it still calls for reduction in 
health provision as a main strategy. Another national level reduction is the goal of reducing 
government employees or the public sector which represents around 21 percent of employment 
in Puerto Rico.  
The fiscal plan presents multiple restructuring intentions that will directly affect municipalities. 
Such changes vary within scale and  purpose: reduction on subsidies, consolidations of services 
and closure or merging of key government agencies that directly support local governance all to 
be further discuss below. 
In general terms the reductions of the subsidies granted to the municipalities and to the 
University of Puerto Rico (UPR) are scheduled for reducing approximately to $350 million of 
subsidies and/or in transfers that all the municipality received in four years (2017-10 to 
2020-21). This means that, for the fiscal year 2017-18, $175 million has been automatically 
reduced to all municipalities with the aims of “phasing out all subsidies for 2024.” This have 
huge implications especially for the municipalities that depend on central government transfers. 
!46
Calvesbert
This will become a tremendous destabilizing wave clearly leaving some in a worst-off position 
than others. 
The proposed deductions should be reflected in the intake of the Centro de Recaudación de 
Ingresos Municipales (CRIM) translated as the Municipal Revenue Collection Center. To further 
explain, the CRIM is a municipal entity independent of other government agencies, it was 
created through the approval of Act No. 80 of August 30, 1991, as amended, as part of the 
Municipal Reform process. This agency administers fiscal services for municipalities and is 
responsible for notifying, assessing, collecting, receiving and distributing public funds from the 
property tax, the state subsidy, funds from the local lottery system and any other available funds 
by law for the benefit of the municipalities of Puerto Rico. In addition, it is responsible for the 
existing property cadastre for each municipality as well as keeping it updated. The property 
cadastre is considered an important database, nevertheless, after the hurricane more problems 
surfaced. The CRIM agency “did not have an updated cadastre, therefore, the damages have not 
been evaluated quickly and effectively” (Re-Imagina Puerto Rico “Re-Imagine Puerto Rico,” 
2018, p. 30) Starting to evidence the challenges between austerity measure and a post-disaster 
reconstruction effort. 
In regards to the University of Puerto Rico, the main public university system of Puerto Rico and 
a government-owned corporation that is comprised of 11 campuses in multiple municipalities, is 
also under listed for reduction of subsidies. The plans seek to slice in half the budget and 
increase students tuition fees, goals that proved problematic on many counts, it may generate 
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short-term fiscal benefits to the island yet at the cost of stifling two important resources, local 
economic ecosystem and human-knowledge capital. Additionally, in relation to public services, 
the plan seeks the consolidation of services along with streamlining legal frameworks to remove 
barriers for collaboration and, it can be argued, that the planning framework should also be 
revised. These are measures of fiscal disciplines in concert with increasing the opportunity for 
doing business, exhibiting that at its core, only certain economic values are being taken in 
consideration leaving behind the in-depth analysis of the shortcomings and long-term effects in 
the population. Parallel to revising the fiscal plan, the local press and news were also explored in 
relation to the topic of the fiscal plan and the results are mixed. However, given the lack of 
consideration to social variables in combination with the strong public opposition, this jumps as 
an alarming issue. Therefore, the persistence of mass protests, demonstrations and taking over 
the UPR and public spaces along with the resurgence of new political actions in Puerto Rico, as 
well as with the diaspora in the mainland, completely contradict the FOMB task of creating a 
necessary foundation to restore Puerto Ricans opportunities. 
5.2.1 Consolidating Services 
Municipalities have undergone dramatic retrenchment due to the fiscal consolidation plans by the 
central government because of the economic crisis and the decline of their fiscal capacity. The 
consolidation of public services across multiple municipalities is a mechanism to reduce cost in 
“public works and infrastructure, public safety, family services, education and housing.” The 
fiscal plan based this understanding after a study of 2016 by Estudios Técnicos that established 
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that a scheme of shared-services will reduce a combined municipal operating expenses around 
$150 to $450 millions USD. “Services Sharing” is a shorthand for the cross-municipal efforts 
practices that already exist within some municipalities, for example, solid waste management, 
public safety and general administrative services are already being share within municipalities.. 
This has further potential to be regionalized or shared among groups of municipalities yet should 
not be seen as a panacea solution given the diverse needs found on the ground, including the 
topographical and geographical variations. 
On a parallel track the current pro-statehood Governor Roselló and his administration have been 
discussing the idea of transforming and consolidating the municipalities’ political organization 
into a much smaller group of regions containing cities, modeled directly after the Counties 
system of States and cities on mainland U.S.. This idea of re-organization would dramatically 
transform the political economy of these cities, and would requiere concerted planning efforts if 
they intend to ensure the public services delivery for all citizens. 
5.2.2 Streamlining Legal Frameworks 
The fiscal plan also includes a section to present the need of streamlining the legal frameworks 
of municipalities, to support this idea it makes reference to a Legislation passed in New Jersey in 
2007 called “Uniform Shared Services and Consolidation Act,” to formalize accountability 
through placing the responsibility on local leadership. In the case of Puerto Rico there is an 
existing effort through the Autonomous Municipal Act that incentivized some municipalities to 
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share services, however, further legislation will be needed for enforcement. It seems that 
streamlining local legal frameworks can’t be isolated from implementation and guidance of a 
planning framework, already existing, and could be further developed since it is the nature of the 
Planning Board of Puerto Rico’s mission. Nonetheless, the Planning Board of Puerto Rico seems 
to have a limited saying under the new governing context. 
It is worth mentioning that in 2015 the Commission on Decentralization and Autonomous 
Regions under the PPD party contemplated the creation of autonomous regions that would allow 
smaller municipalities to share functions and services, thus, to reduce their costs. This effort 
presented the opportunity for the central government to greatly support previous plans and 
further develop the municipal autonomy in order to expand choices of services by addressing the 
needed population of the island in an efficient and  planed manner. This model, however, does 
not support the elimination of municipal governance. 
5.2.3 Closures and Merging of Key Agencies 
The fiscal restructuring plan also brings changes on supporting agencies at the local institutional 
framework even though that currently it lacks formal mechanism of an existing superior fiscal 
supervision, the Office of the Commissioner of Municipal Affairs (OCAM) served as a limited 
advisor and regulator at the municipal level.  The role of OCAM was highly debate, however, the 
enchantment of  Law 81-2017 eliminated the OCAM. 
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In order to layout the impact of de-linking particular agencies that municipalities have depended 
on is important to note that OCAM was created in 1991 by the AMA of 1991. AMA enacts that 
OCAM has the responsibility to regulate, advise and give technical and professional assistance to 
municipalities in the areas related to their organization, administration, functioning and operation 
for the municipal autonomous development. Now that OCAM is out of the supporting system in 
regards to financial oversight and employment purposes, is necessarily to understand the gaps 
that are needed to be filled, or on the contrary, that are going to be eliminated. The following 
table (Table 2) describes describes some of the critical task produced by OCAM. 
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The tasks originally produced by OCAM are now under two different agencies: (1) under the 
central government OGP inside the Oficina de Gerencia Municipal (OGM) and (2) a new 
institution called Office of Socio-Economic and Community Development (ODSEC). This was a 
structural change that occurred in a few weeks with an administration change, and per 
interviewees it was not plan nor pondered at all. 
ODSEC is the result of a former division called, Oficina de Comunidades Especiales (OCE) 
endowment of former Gov. Sila M. Calderón (2001-2005) that has been "strengthen" by merging 
the rest of the components of OCAM. ODSEC has now the “purpose of modernizing, 
simplifying, unifying and streamlining governmental processes and services in order to achieve 
the full development of the third sector and Communities.” This division seeks to promote 
community economic development through alliances between non-profit organizations and the 
community at large. Furthermore, this new division has been given new oversight responsibilities 
that constitute the identification of funds to nourish another newly created Social Reinvestment 
Fund. It also became a new level of local administration and public policy, regulators have been 
asked to identify government services (public services) and facilities that could be delegated to 
municipalities and non-profit organizations as a measure to cut spending in the public sector. In 
other words, the fiscal plan increases the competition level for municipalities as a form of 
creating support; bringing perhaps more challenges than real aid. 
The closing and the merging of key agencies like OCAM will affect first the smaller and more 
vulnerable municipalities. This fact is concerning since at the time when the island needs a 
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robust public sector to take on the task of post-disaster recovery, fiscal support to run basic 
services, the fiscal plan aims to remove and decrease the coverage of the public sector in the 
name of efficiency as well as redundancy. The reason given for the foregoing of OCAM was the 
need to establish a more agile and effective government, to avoid duplicity of services and to 
keep with the times of economic hardship that faces the island. OCAM stopped functioning in 
2017 by the order of current Governor Rosselló administration to expect a yearly saving of 
$500,000 (Irizarry Álvarez, 2017). What this implies is that even though that the FOMB and 
central government struggle to install their own vision of the island’s fiscal and operational 
affairs, both governing bodies are spearheading agendas that weaken local governance. Despite 
that the municipal legal frame is not modified, the relations between local governance and OGM 
must be taken care of— an information that this research did not locate.  
In general terms the fiscal plan omits the importance of municipal functions. As a result, this can 
be understood as the steady beginnings of developing protocols to dismantle municipal roles 
with the strong inclination of the private sector to succeed in the public sector. As companion of 
this tendency and in order to merge institutions, existing public employees must be transferred or 
dismissed. What has occurred is that employer transfers have been made from their regional 
offices to the new headquarters in San Juan, which results in the abandonment of the community 
management that was being carried out through the old offices in the regions that will now 
remain neglected with less local involvement. By closing OCAM, combined with the effects of 
both hurricanes, Puerto Rico’s central government was posed with the new challenge during this 
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turmoil since the logistics needed to be re-configured and disentangled produced even more 
levels of uncertainty in the municipalities.  
5.3 Phase 1: The Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan of Puerto Rico 
As part of an executive order done in October 2017, Puerto Rico’s Central Recovery & 
Reconstruction Office (COR3) was created as the new centralized office of reconstruction of the 
country. COR3 was designed as –another public-private partnership, to coordinate within a single 
entity all reconstruction efforts in the island.  Additionally, it also serves as a channel to make or 
accelerate more public-private alliances agreements viable given the new context. This office 
was mandated to be produced thanks to the U.S. Congress’ Economic and Disaster Recovery 
Plan of Puerto Rico in order to comply with the enactment of the Budget Act of 2018, which 
required, under Section 21210, that the central government of Puerto Rico devise, develop and 
submit a report by August 8, 2018— one month after the historic devastation of hurricanes Irma 
and María. This spatial petition serves as evidence that Puerto Rico is still under colonial 
governance, simultaneously, highlights the structural discrimination that Puerto Rico is still 
subjugated totally disregarding the emergency state that was unfolding. Furthermore, as reported 
in the New York Times, HUD Secretary Ben Carson claims that given the island’s “history of 
fiscal malfeasance, we are putting additional financial controls in place to ensure this disaster 
recovery money is spent properly” (Jeff Stein, Tracy Jan, and Josh Dawsey, 2018). 
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The plan focus on fostering sustainable economic growth optimizing critical infrastructure in 
Puerto Rico, increasing resilience capacity to recovery in future disasters. It also institutes that 
through resiliency Puerto Ricans can be guaranteed an educated, safe and healthy society. COR3 
establishes as a driving force for the installment of government transparency as a core principle 
for the recovery process. Along those lines, it also seeks the implementation and fiscal 
transparency of the recovery investments. Puerto Rico requested around $ 94.4 billion in federal 
disaster assistance, becoming one of the largest and most complex disasters recovery efforts in 
U.S. history. COR3 reports established that: 
“Because the resources available for response were inadequate for the scale of the 
disaster, the failure of the lifeline systems meant that emergency services were severely 
compromised and residents lacked electricity, food, and water for a prolonged period. 
And with roads impassable, residents had limited access to medical care. After the 
hurricanes, people lost their jobs, schools were closed, government services and private 
enterprise could no longer operate effectively, landslides caused flooding hazards, and 
wastewater polluted marine environments” 
It poses the main question of, how the Government of Puerto Rico and nongovernmental, 
private, and nonprofit organizations will work together towards recovery? It establishes that the 
reconstruction effort must be anchored in five major endeavors: target both economic and social 
progress, take the current needs looking towards the future, implement “state-of-the-art 
infrastructure” and the most related to this research, promote safe, educated, healthy and 
sustainable society in concert with transparency and innovation in governance— another way of 
establishing public administration. This suggests that the reconstruction effort will be deploying 
an “integrated approach” combined with an ongoing calibration of recovery investment for short 
and long-term benefits. Understanding that this new agency will monitor the interdependency 
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nature of governance and post-disaster efforts it does recognized the critical role that the 
municipalities are positioned in. 
Additionally, their document also highlights that the migration is a challenge and by encouraging 
economic growth through the “ease of doing business” it will stimulate labor participation and 
broadening tax base agreeing on fiscal discipline. COR3  calls the municipal participation by 
pursuing the revitalization of urban centers, as a locus for economic recovery effort.  Moreover, 
related to public services, it seeks to “scale social services” to meet the economic needs along 
with the current and future population resulting in various ambiguous descriptions. It is not clear 
if this means that these services are going to be expanded to better match the population’s size 
since after the hurricanes it was evidenced that vulnerable population lack lifeline systems, or the 
opposite, that in order to meet economic needs (fiscal discipline) these are going to be even more 
limited.  Therefore, the Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan of Puerto Rico creates another set 
of challenges for municipalities. The central government has a plan, but has it planned with the 
municipalities in mind? has it incorporated their needs? This is a crucial gap. 
5.4 Phase 2: Interviews’ Takeaways 
The findings from the interviews could be summarized in four common themes:  questionable 
autonomy level that the municipalities have, relationship between the municipalities and the 
central government is in greater flux, a generalized idea of lack of data and exhaustive analysis, 
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and lastly, a questionable performance of the FOMB underscored by the misalignments between 
governmental bodies. 
5.4.1 A Questionable Autonomy Level for Municipalities 
In the case of Puerto Rico, the concept of transfer of central government power to local 
governments has been defined as municipal autonomy. From 1991 this concept has been 
transformed into State policy upon the approval of the Law of Autonomous Municipalities 
(AMA) as mentioned before. Yet municipalities are in disadvantage in an economical stand since  
they depend mostly on the property tax and municipal patents as a source of revenue. In addition 
almost all of the municipalities receive economic injection provided by the federal agencies to 
run local programs. Certainly it can be argued that the municipalities are in a terrible crisis 
because of the population drop and, in addition, there is no longer the economic growth that 
existed sometime before; as an indirect condition large companies have looked for alternatives 
outside of Puerto Rico.  
Understanding the municipalities as a second layer of governance within the island brings 
contradicting opinions and thoughts for its present and future role. Some believe that the 
municipalities are in an advantageous position, as the President of the Federation of Pro-
Statehood Mayors, mentioned that after the hurricanes the municipalities showed that “they are 
the ones in control at this moment since the central government is totally bankrupt.”  Arguing 
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that Mayors and local governance are in an advantageous position in addition to the 
municipalities that have their own resources since it is not the general condition of all. 
The hurricane evidenced that municipalities are the first line of defense since the Mayors have 
taken the lead to manage their own finances,  some began to work with each other by leaving 
behind the political divide. The President of the Federation of Pro-Statehood Mayors goes further 
in claiming that "if it had not been for the municipalities and this local government, the central 
government would have struggled. We would still be in a crisis mode.” Yet again, municipalities 
seem to be constrained under the new context and given the levels of fiscal decline public 
services will depend on the economic resources of each municipality. 
The Director of ETI also mentioned that “the municipalities are in a terrible crisis due to the out-
migration wave happening in the country in combination with the lack of economic development 
and importance given to growth strategies. These are some of the reasons why large companies 
are looking for better deals outside of Puerto Rico.” However, the former high-rank government 
officers were the most direct in regards to local governance by asserting that “the municipalities 
are going to run out of money. When this happens they will not be able to give any type of 
services. That is, or they organize or they will perish.” The two underlying circumstances that 
emerge from these conversations are that either municipalities are absorbed by the state or they 
organize themselves to support their local power, the latter is something they have started doing. 
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One of the Directors of ABRE mentioned in a colloquial description when asked about his 
thought on the role of the municipalities, “they believe that they govern themselves and that they 
can do whatever they want within their territory” representing an ideological divided that even 
though municipalities have autonomy powers they should still be structured by the central 
government. On the other hand, certain NGOs preferred to skip the municipal bureaucracies and 
aim for direct access to the cities population in order to offer services needed. One of the NGO’s 
leaders, that opted to remain anonymous, said they are directly managing federal funding, 
particularly the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG), that skip both central 
and local governments, since the federal requirements allows them to do so. 
5.4.2 Misalignment Between Governmental Bodies 
Before and after the hurricanes, at the national level, the fiscal decisions were based on what the 
FOMB allowed as stipulated in the PROMESA. However, the inconsistency between SA, the 
lack of communication between agencies and levels of government, including Federal and State 
are alarming given that one of the main tasks for the FOMB–if it is considered a legitimate body, 
is to manage and propose structural reforms. The former high-rank government officers describe 
the before and after the hurricane panorama candidly by saying that "there was no logical order 
or clarity of who does what.” However, at the municipal level, the two oppositional political 
parties are looking for a mechanism to get together and handle the fiscal conditions and the 
distribution of public services. They have realized that "the municipal issue has nothing to do 
with the political party…” In other words, the crisis has broken the partisan stalemate—this has 
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evidenced an opportunity. The leader analyst for social policy at ETI comments with a hopeful 
tone that it would be great if municipalities achieve it or that this tendency gets carried out to its 
maximum expression. 
5.4.3 Relationship Between the Municipalities and the Central Government 
The historical trajectory in regards to the role of municipalities starts with heavy centralization 
tendencies in the hands of the central government. Ever since the AMA in 1991 and in 
accordance with multiple interviewees, they argued that it did not have the expected impact 
evidenced on the list of amendments the law had to go to. Some interviewees claimed the issue 
prevails given the lack of a robust development scheme that could hold together the central and 
municipal government. Furthermore, around 2006 when the economic contraction begins, some 
central roles had been delegated to the municipalities, but the central government had not given 
the correct funding mechanism in order for them to handle on a long-term path. For example, at 
the time all of the seventy-eight municipalities were encouraged to establish a "Municipal 
Police,” gaining a new expense to manage and services to provide. Other delegations stem from 
the legal framework of new laws like the Law 81, that required the municipalities to provide free 
of charge to all non-profit organizations, sports, recreational facilities, and community centers 
that are under their ownership. As long as the third-sector used these facilities to carry out 
activities related to the community perpetuating the possibility to receive other ways of revenues 
within a limited income panorama. 
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At another scale of programming, the Department of Recreation and Sports (national level 
agency) was not able to carry out its primary functions of providing and managing all the 
recreational and direct sports services to the entire island, due to the proliferation of facilities. 
Ironically, the way this deficiency got solved was by passing these facilities to the municipalities 
and their effective control without any compensation or extra support to take on this task. These 
circumstances could also be part of the explanation of the consistent borrowing practices that the 
municipalities do. Understanding that municipalities are sometimes pushed to the fringes but 
other moments are encourage on heroic duties in name of the community underscores a faulty 
treatment and asymmetry in power. 
Others have called out another  Law No. 10 of 2017 that supports a new government structure 
that allows the expansion or insertion of the Third Sector and encourages government 
decentralization in order to make way for privatization. This new vision frames the third sector 
as the mediator to increase citizen participation, a yearning that the government of Puerto Rico 
has formalized in documents but not in practice. Yet again, the AMA also includes a section on 
citizen participation at the municipal level, an aspect that Puerto Rico has not been able to 
develop and is less possible with the imposition of the FOMB.  
5.4.4 Generalized Idea of Lack of Data and Exhaustive Analysis 
All of the interviewees mentioned at some point the lack of data in Puerto Rico. It was also 
highlighted that most of the information provided and published in the official documents have 
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not clear parameters of analysis were used.  Nonetheless, the former high-rank government 
officers, justly because of their experience, called out that “this restructuring is being worked 
with a highly questionable data, in addition, many times everything is being outsourced to 
consultants” which could increase margins of error or even decrease trustworthiness by not 
having in-ground or double-checked knowledge. A local analyst and economist from the Institute 
of Statistics also pointed out that the gathering and processing of information available at that 
moment are not working at the highest level affecting all possible efforts. This deficiency reveals 
the historical erosion in which Puerto Rico is placed currently as a result of decades of neglect 
from multiple governmental agencies, institutional decay and deteriorated socio-political-
economic structure. Bringing to the fore, now that it is critical to have this valuable information, 
for the decision making "there is none” said the former high-rank government officer. On the 
other hand, Estudios Técnicos has been identified as producers of multiple studies and 
specifically for municipalities and at the same time for the FOMB, however, they seem to be 
hesitant in sharing any official data when asked. 
  
5.5 Phase 3: Looking at Socio-Economic Trends at a National Scale 
Data and statistics play a crucial role in assessing and monitoring the status of social and 
economic development in a country. Moreover, austerity measures tend to be a data driven 
decision-making  process for good or for worst its been proven to be highly depend on data 
collection and management, for this reason the following section will explore socio economic 
data and municipal financial expenses in order to devise impact and opportunity that the 
municipal governance could have in the newer context of Puerto Rico. 
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The above line graph (Figure 6) presents a steep population loss of 14.44% at a national level in 
the past years until 2017. That is, an indication of population decline at a negative rate of 1.3% 
each year on average (annualized rate). On December 2018, the U.S. Census Bureau published 
that Puerto Rico had a total population of 3,195,153 in that same year, resulting in a cumulative 
decrease from 2006 to 2018 of 19.09% which also increases the rate to negative 1.74% each year 
on average (annualized rate).  
The population loss have larger implications like elevating the per capita debt (Figure 7) and 
reducing the possibility of a stronger tax base along with affecting decision around public 
services. Moreover, the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that “[t]he decrease in Puerto Rico’s 
population is primarily due to higher rates of out-migration over in-migration and natural 
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Figure 6: Puerto Ricos’s population between the year 2006-2018.
Puerto Rico’s Population 2006-2018
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increase.” Puerto Ricans tend to migrate to the mainland, United States, where they believe there 
are higher chances of receiving a range of services and in general will encounter better 
opportunities. Yet, that is not always the case although both Spanish and English are official 
languages in Puerto Rico, 2016 ACS data indicates that fewer than one quarter of residents speak 
English “very well,” reflecting higher complications for the population that are able to relocate.   
It can be considered that outer-migration and lack of opportunity in combination with services 
are drivers of the change in population at a municipal level. Constrains in labor opportunity, 
education and salary levels also causes inward migration marking a regional conditions that 
needs to be further considered. Additionally, instability in population presents one of the biggest 
hurdles at a national level along with a planning challenge: What should be done or prioritized in 
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Figure 7: Puerto Ricos’s debt per capita from 2007-2018.
Puerto Rico’s Debt per Capita 2007-2018
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the context of fiscal restructuring combined with post-disaster reconstruction? The first is 
anchored in a pro-growth paradigm and the second acknowledges the shrinking effects of 
combined conditions. It is crucial to acknowledge that this smooth trend seen in a national scale 
does not reflect the same ways in the municipalities (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Puerto Ricos’s population change per municipality from 2007-2018.










Out of the seventy eight municipalities only three of them reflect an increase in population: 
Gurabo with 10.3%, Toa Alta 2.5%, and Naguabo less than 1%. Yet, almost all of the 
municipalities display negative trend, the highest points are for Ceiba with -24.9%, Guánica 
-20.7% followed by Lares with almost the same -20.8%. However, the research case studies fall 
around the average trend with Toa Baja -15.4%, Aguada -10.5%, Cayey -9.1% and Adjuntas 
-8.4%. 
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Aggregated Municipal Debt 2007-2018
Figure 9: Puerto Ricos’s aggregated debt at a municipal level between the years  2007-2018.
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In terms of the debt the line graph above (Figure 9) represents the total amount of municipal 
public debt according to the former BGF. These amounts were last updated by the OGP on 
December 12, 2017. They also indicate that the monetary amount at this moment is bundled with 
BGF and the private banking debt which can be problematic and will be discussed below. It is 
known that all the municipalities have borrowed both to finance permanent works and 
improvements in addition to cover ordinary operational costs.  
From 2006 to 2011 fiscal years the general municipal debt rate increased 36.5%. It is important 
to highlight that multiple experts indicate that 2006 marks a critical juncture of Puerto Rico’s 
economic decline, leading to the current crisis in Puerto Rico, this in part was due to the phasing 
out program of Section 936 which municipalities played an important role in housing these big 
industries. Consequently, between 2012 and 2013 are inflections reflected hinting that some 
adjustment were occurring, detail that will be explain further bellow. Moving along the time line 
2014-2015 fiscal years the line start to lose gravity precisely marking when the bankruptcy was 
declared. This steady decline beginning in 2015 can be correlated to the attitude that the local 
governor, Alejandro García Padilla took by boldly announcing that “The debt is not 
payable”(Corkery & Walsh, 2015). However, his two predecessors, Anibal Acevedo Vilá and 
Luis Fortuño, had to leave taxes and shut down the government, and layoff thousand of public 
employees respectively. This same year is when the “economic down spiral” of Puerto Rico hits 
international news. For example, The New York Times reports “Puerto Rico sets the stage for an 
unprecedented test of the United States municipal bond market, which cities and states rely on to 
pay for their most basic needs, like road construction and public hospitals” (Corkery & Walsh, 
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2015). The words “economic crisis” starts to also gain impulse and bigger international actors as 
the bond market participants received a first warning through the Electronic Municipal Market 
Access (EMMA) of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board sent by the Commonwealth to 
inform "the government could not issue the CAFR financial statements for the first of May, 
which was the deadline for submitting them ..." (Joffe, 2018, p.20). Puerto Rico sent a total of 
three official messages, as reported by Mercatus Center (Joffe, 2018). Another report done in this 
same year by prominent economist and former director of the Monetary Fund, Anne O. Krueger 
in collaboration with Ranjit Teja and Andrew Wolfe explicitly assert that “a crisis looms” and 
that the trend of public spending coupled with accumulation rate of debt service reassures an 
“unsustainable path,” unless the Government of Puerto Rico implements a “severe fiscal 
adjustment program.” Before the passing of the PROMESA in 2016 and the passing of 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria in the Fall of  2017 the graph reflects greater decreasing tendencies 
due to the fact that Puerto Rico is out of the lending market as the BFG collapsed and fiscal 
disciplines have been enacted since 2014 in regards of the Emergency Fiscal State. All factors 
that become barriers for borrowing. Given the enactment of PROMESA and FOMB’s fiscal plan 
this graph shows a huge plunge, forecasting the critical fiscal decline at the municipal level. 
It is necessary to take into account the economic activities of each municipality in order to 
outline the existent opportunities and at the same time be able to plan necessary changes 
regarding the services provided and local level governance in this yet to come conditions. 
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When looking closer to the municipalities this study started by creating a list that accounted for a 
single year (2016) all the municipalities and their services, based on the singles audits, in order to 
have a sense of the range of services provided.  The list had more than 500 entries, however 
some services do repeat themselves by municipalities, when repeated services were filtered-out 
the list yield 83 different combinations of services. However in accordance to the four 
municipalities used (Aguada, Adjuntas, Cayey and Toa Baja) as case study, the study services are 
the following: 
 1. Publics Safety 
 2. Public Works sometimes includes Sanitation 
 3. Cultural Recreation sometimes includes Education  
 4. Economic and Community Development, sometimes each are a standalone categories  
 5. Health sometimes includes Welfare, Public Housing together or sometimes each are a   
 standalone category 
Therefore, public services as proven are not a homogenous category between municipalities even 
though they are govern by the same legal structures. This may be a positive condition because it 
may suggest that municipalities are adjusting to their local needs and realities. Nevertheless, it 
can be negative in a context of trying to assess what is happening at the island level since it 
creates imbalances to achieve a comparison between municipalities. It was also found that the 
documentation varies within the same municipality and this limits even more a comprehensive 
study at a municipal level. 
Moreover, constrains related to studying services delivery within the established time frame 
given that the fieldwork visit where done around a festive season there was no successful 
connection with the municipalities staff. However, Municipalities and City Halls were visited, 
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contacted and conversations came together but never as in depth as the interviews. In general 
terms, this study detected some levels of uneasiness for communicating or holding interviews 
with Mayors or other governmental official. While not confirmed, this could be an indicative of 
the tension around the topic. It can also be suggesting that perhaps the connectivity of this 
governmental body with the general public and its transparency or openness is also a relevant 
issue. A condition that impede inquiring about how exactly the municipalities are managing the 
situation in regards of public services. This research was not able to identify the maneuvers 
happening at local level from firsthand. Although limited, looking at reports and press, some of 
the municipalities are consistently mentioned and it served as a snapshot of the on-ground 
situation but no single conclusion could be extrapolated in specific for the seventy-eight 
municipalities. 
5.6 Phase 4: Reading and Exploring the Municipal Financial Audits 
When looking closer to Aguada, Adjuntas, Cayey and Toa Baja municipalities it is possible to 
recognize in terms of numerical data, multiple flections not registered at a national level. The 
following section will provide analysis and findings related to the statement of activities from the 
single audits. 
The municipality’s financial statements are designed to present citizens, taxpayers, customers, 
investor, creditor and multiple governmental agencies a general overview of the municipal fiscal 
and budgeting practices, which creates accountability for the money and services they deliver, 
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received and manages. However, these documents even though they are required for central 
government to issue oversight and are known as a standardized process all seventy eight 
municipality have their own order and format. Moreover, within the same municipalities these 
documents tend to be inconsistent, maybe due to the change in staff every four-year, possible 
administrative turn over, producing lack of continuation or rather a result of the suspension of 
operating staff within the municipality itself. Variances can further gain a negative effect by 
creating bigger hurdles for analysis  in relation to both public services and local governance 
since these reports are the only mechanism at place to maintain or recover capital access and in 
turn, insure all basic services are operating and serving correctly to general public. 
In general, the public data collected at the moment shows gaps for certain years, mostly after the 
hurricanes. This indicates that certain municipalities are behind in preparing required documents 
including ones that the central government audits placing some municipalities in a constant 
worst-off position. By associating other impacts related to municipal government resources and 
employee reduction makes it even more difficult to fulfill and comply to the central government 
requests and society at large. It is understood by an economic analyst from the Instituto de 
Estadísticas, that municipalities operate at least with one year and a half of delay. Currently, he is 
in charge of assembling a public database on the municipal financial statements, but before doing 
so, the Comptroller's Office has to validate and process the data used, that also tends to delay its 
publishing and examination. The existence of ongoing gaps between years not related to the 
hurricanes is contradicting since PROMESA and the FOMB were put in place to connect certain 
aspects of budgeting and reports, in part, from the lack of clarity around the issuing of debt of the 
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country. Furthermore, it was found that due to the passing of Hurricanes Irma and Maria The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Executive Office of the President of the United 
States, issued a memorandum on October 26, 2017 granting agencies the flexibility to allow ‘’[a] 
delay [in] the completion and submission of the Single Audit report to twelve months beyond the 
normal due date’’ as a result of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria.  At least, twelve 
municipalities included Toa Baja had been granted until 14-21 March of 2018 to submit. 
Nevertheless, Toa Baja’s Single Audit reports for 2016 has not been published. These late 
reporting makes it hard to preformed uniform analysis as well signals other challenges between 
state, central and local governmental roles that will further hinder public services at large. 
However by analyzing the tendencies between revenues and expenditure it was possible to 
examine to a certain extent the balance act being done at the four municipalities to keep their 
system operating based on their statement of activities. The following findings were extracted 
from  the comparison of the three financial categories of a municipality: (1) Program Revenue, 
(2) General Revenue and (3) Expenses (this information was organized in a new table by the 
author). Program Revenue represent charges for services, fees, licenses and permits in 
combination with operating grants which include operating-specific and discretionary grants 
(either operating or capital) which some of them are provided by US federal government and 
central government. General Revenues include all taxes that the municipalities use to operate, in 
consequence are the funds that are being restructured these includes: Property tax, Municipal 




• Property Tax is recognized as revenues in the year for which the taxes are levied 
• Municipal license taxes are recorded as revenues in the period the Municipality has an 
enforceable legal claim and time requirements are met 
• Sales and use taxes (IVU)  are recognized as revenues in the period when the 
underlying exchange has occurred. 
Municipality's expenses cover a range of non-uniform public services in combination with the 
interest on long term debt. In brief, the main findings for the Municipal Single Audit exploration 
are as follows (Figure 10). 
General Findings— Municipal Single Audit exploration
1. The realities of the municipalities goes beyond fiscal parameters and a homogenous policy 
does not align with their governance patterns. It is this same truth the reason why 
municipalities should reinvent their role in  Puerto Ricos’ newer context.
2. Even though they are required for central government to issue oversight and is known as a 
standardized process all seventy eight municipality have their own order and format.
3.Within the same municipalities these document tend to be inconsistent, maybe due to the 
change in staff every four-year possible administrative turn over, producing lack of 
continuation or rather a result of the suspension of operating staff within the municipality itself.
4. Certain municipalities are behind in preparing required documents including ones that the 
central government audits placing some municipalities in a constant worst-off position
5. Based on comparison of revenues the highest source of income for all four municipalities 
comes from grants & contribution. Evidencing how vulnerable the municipalities are in terms of 
fiscal health given that this revenue tend to shift depending on the agendas of the central and 
federal government. The second highest are the income generated by the property tax 
underscoring the connection between land and buildings evidencing the importance of local 
urban planning efforts given that planing policy have the potential to shape tax revenues.
6. Based on comparison of expenses it seems that even though there is an established yearly 
budget for each municipality the cost of operations tend to shift in time. These constant 
changes can indicate that there are discretionary decision being made towards what must get 
funded. Nevertheless, it can also be reflection of the layered conditions of the whole island.
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Figure 10: General Findings, Municipal Single Audit exploration.
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6. DISCUSSION 
This thesis seek to understand the formulation of an austerity agenda in Puerto Rico by exploring 
it impact on municipal public services. To be able to connect the newer context of the island and 
the efforts impacting public services it was necessary to establish the political economy ties 
behind PROMESA, the persistent fiscal decline, the historic lack of economic growth, 
overplayed a major fiscal restructuring in combination with a massive post-disaster recovery 
and reconstruction. Findings from the interviews, document analysis and single audit expenditure 
suggested that complicated relationships and conditionings can be streamlined. Moreover, by 
achieving a mix-method approach this study identifies that the impacts of austerity measures 
given the unique planning and oversight requirements imposed by the U.S. the Congress on the 
Government of Puerto Rico. Political economy forces are a critical factor in how local systems 
have developed and will perform marking such factors just as important for urban service 
delivery as it is for general funding, technical capacity and institutional framework without 
excluding in any of them there human impact. Given this backdrop the driving force for all this 
study has is the core question of: what can urban planning do? 
6.1 Degenerated Structural Conditions that Define Puerto Rico’s Socioeconomic Landscape 
Many local scholars in Puerto Rico refer to the years of 2007-2017 as “the lost decade.” As 
Deepak Lamba-Nieves presented in an Architecture League New York event this past year, titled 
“Power to Puerto Rico: Putting Resilience in Context” he explained that all major economic 
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indicators have plummeted. He further exposed that the island’s economic activity shrunk by 
18%, employment levels decreased by 20% and followed this statistic with saying that the 
proportion of people available to work, sets around 41% only. Therefore, announces that one-
third of the government was reduced and coupled it by stating that the total population through 
this decade has consistently decreased by totaling to 12%. Then he adds that tracing the 
outmigration presents a challenge due to the data collection and the haste in which people left the 
island after the passing of the hurricanes. Indirectly, he underscored the dire situation after this 
phenomenon and signals further complications are at stake. These were his opening remarks to 
start the presentation and are the backdrop for contextualizing public services and reports the 
conditions that more than 3 million of Puerto Ricans have endured in a decade of economic 
stagnation. This in addition of what it is unfolding for the years to come. 
Evidenced by the history of Puerto Rico, conditionings may speak more directly about the 
relationship that the territory has with the mainland that foresee complications at the present. 
Nevertheless, the economic situation has serious consequence for both the island and United 
State at large. The fiscal decline also ties in the inactions of local policies, where is confirmed 
that the central focus has been implementing measures also defined by either to capture revenue 
or to staying away from spending, leaving out other forms of redistribution. In addition to the 
passing of Hurricanes Irma and María, both the creation of the FOMB and the process of  debt 
restructuring were the subject of heated debates. However, that was not the case with the 
definition of essential services and to this day neither the central government nor the FOMB has 
taken a position on what should be the primary benefits provided by the government. Thus far, 
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the scourge of a hurricane has been necessary to bring the public needs to the center of attention. 
Yet, the unique planning and oversight requirements imposed to Puerto Rico by the FOMB is 
focused on its restructuring mandate with no evidenced intention to protect public services. 
By juxtaposing theses conditioning factors and integrating it with the found ambiguous state of 
data provided and collected, raises the concern of  how the current measures are been conceived. 
Under the studied conditions, Puerto Rico’s austerity program demonstrates the ideological 
underpinning of the solutions proposed.  
Certainly Puerto Rico is under austerity, multiple indicators arise from the mix-method analysis 
and data collection done for this project. It can be fairly indicated that impact is played out in 
multiple scales and from various actors, the main sources comes from the FOMB and the central 
government. The austerity paradigm has translated quickly to the local government as a viciously 
fiscal discipline. In general terms, decreasing more than half of the General Fund, employment 
cuts, closing agencies, pushing for privatization, shrinking and centralizing public sector and 
hindering participatory channels from key agencies like the Planning Board and municipalities 
were found.  This restructuring raises in parallel democratic concerns further heightened by the 
FOMB and the central government proactively making decisions behind closed doors 
incentivizing even more uncertainty. 
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6.2 Central and Local Entangled Governance 
The Article 14 of the AMA establishes a framework between the central government and the 
municipalities: 
“In order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
interference or duplication of efforts, services or expenses, agencies [of the] 
central government will maintain adequate communication with the 
municipalities and inform the plans, projects, programs and activities 
that may be of interest to the municipality for the purpose of achieving 
coordination or integration of activities or operations to the most possible extent.” 
This statute was based on the premise that the State would stop doing things for the municipality 
to take care of it. This did not happen and what occured was that the municipalities and the 
central government where trying to do the same thing at different scales with questionable 
results. This could be confirmed by the current narrative between the FOMB and the central 
government that insist of reducing payroll expenses, eliminating duplication of efforts and 
consolidating agencies that are not justified for having them. Yet, as Municipal Judge, Hon. 
Alfonso Martínez Piovanetti explains the relationship between the central government and the 
municipalities is characterized by “administrative dynamism by the search for efficiency in the 
provision of government services, and above all, by the recognition – whether express or implicit 
– that it is not a relationship between equal parts” (Piovanetti, 2014, p. 950). It can be argued that 
the centralization of government services in the past had been seen as a measure to initiate the 
country's economic growth process (Ramos Gonzalez & Negrón Portillo, 2008). Still, the same 
Autonomous Municipal Act claims that: “[i]n a democratic government system like ours [Puerto 
Rico’s], where power emanates from the people, the Government structures must be designed to 
!77
Calvesbert
meet their needs to the extent that economic resources allow. Until now, the legislative power of 
providing services resides in the central government. However, it should be noted that the public 
services under this context shows a backward movement and does not necessarily demonstrates a 
progressive development. 
The existing misalignment between the municipalities and the central government institutional 
framework has being reinforced with the enactment of PROMESA which undoes previous efforts 
taken towards a governmental collaboration by installing a supra-hierarchy infused with a double 
budgetary supervision and limiting the decisions based on fiscal reduction cost, which resumes 
centralization efforts. Yet, this is not only causing problems to the municipalities but to all the 
Puerto Ricans since the realities of the municipalities and the individuals goes beyond fiscal 
parameters. 
The autonomy of a municipality per Puerto Rico’s Planning Board is measured by scales of 
autonomy (1-5) intrinsically accepting the incremental approach tied to the economic-political 
process. The highest level of autonomy is level 5, is to govern, plan, and allows municipalities to 
control land use and issue building permits, and potentially these municipalities can craft their 
own Plan de Usos de Ordenamiento (Local Land Use Plan). These levels of autonomy allow a 
series of powers to order both public and private land, including the power of expropriation 
(eminent domain). In principle they should align themselves with the central government Plan de 
Usos de Terreno (PUT). This could seem as a correct mode of serving a long term development 
strategy nevertheless, according to the interviews, only ten to eleven municipalities have reached 
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this rank of hierarchy, signaling limited enforcement of local planning and to an extent taken for 
granted. When trying to identify what role the Planning Board has played it was inconclusive 
despite their active involvement on all the development strategy of the past. Again, the former 
high-rank government officers when asked about the involvement with the urban planning field 
expressed “they have not had an active role, this is being handled with consulting firms and in 
AFFAF, as purely economic and financial terms.” Clearly evidencing the larger economical lens 
over the delivery of public services. Furthermore, by the triangulation of the four phases of this 
study urban planning has not been leveraged to attended the municipal crisis despite its 
availability as a resource. 
Following the urban planning interest, this study managed to identify that at a national scale state 
entities define their regions or service boundaries according to the criterion that best meets their 
needs. Based on a recent article, the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (Autoridad de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados, AAA) divides its work into five operational regions (North, South, West, East, 
and Metro), while the Bureau of Emergency and Disaster Management uses the 11 zones of the 
Planning Board to operate (Aguadilla, Mayagüez, Arecibo, Ponce, Vega Baja, Comerío, San 
Juan, Guayama, Caguas, Humacao and Ceiba). Besides these national discrepancies, the 
Governor Ricardo Rosselló warned on March 17, 2019 that the municipalities would be 
inoperative within five years if the system under which they operate is not changed, while 
suggesting to implement a model of Counties and cities like in mainland U.S.. It is clear that the 
only motivation of the central government, until now, is purely fiscal savings and highlights the 
lack of a development plan to guide territorial decision making. Weeks later, on March 26, 2019 
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the Governor announced a proposal to create a new county system based on “changes that must 
be made in the municipal governments to address the economic and fiscal crisis that looms for 
the municipalities with the elimination of state contributions, projected to occur by 2024” (Cortés 
Chico, 2019). Furthermore, when presenting the proposal the governor claim that  “[i]t is not 
because of a person [mayors], they are decisions taken over time, possibly wrong since the 
beginning of the concept of autonomous municipalities,” claim that directly questions the role of 
the municipalities. Proven on what was previously discussed, the rationale behind the autonomy 
of the municipalities stems from the ideology of closeness to the people and as a platform for 
democratic principles, key aspects that should be maintained. According to the planner Gabriel 
Rodríguez, who has a column in the local newspaper asserts that “[t]he criteria should be 
efficiency and that should be to meet the government objective at the lowest possible cost. If you 
do not meet the objective of the service, you are not efficient”. 
6.3 Eliminating or Consolidating 
The debate of eliminating or decentralizing municipalities is not new in Puerto Rico. However, 
there is now an external pressure and hierarchical powers as the FOMB that where not in place 
before and are pushing for action.  The only aspect that has kept consistent is that whichever 
measure is taken, both protect the permanence of the geographical demarcations and the current 
names of all the suppressed municipalities. Some argue that there is a wide range of functions 
that can be carried out through local governments: issues such as education, parks, 
environmental health, garbage collection, tax collection and permits, local planning, participatory 
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process among others. The latter evidenced after the storms and the lack of timely aid, those who 
have stayed working at the local level have been largely efforts from the communities. This type 
of resources cannot be lost, and should be the one of the axis in which Puerto Rico seeks to 
develop. 
The current system has lead to a concentration of economic activity and decision-making power 
as it is now, in a single area (San Juan) has been adherent in generating the inequality, be it by 
decreasing participative process, access or distribution of goods in Puerto Rico. It is assumed that  
devolution will be better but is it true? — a different research would be needed to study this. 
In other words, the municipalities in Puerto Rico have “the writings are on the wall” — the 
municipal role is at stake in consequent the services offered. The only solution is to think outside 
the box and collaborate with one another given the positive redundancy between municipalities. 
To devise new ways to properly identify their reason for being a second layer of governance and  
deeply think to what extent the municipal role are nimble enough to devise and advocate for a 
new governance frameworks by which planning becomes essential to define it. As explained in 
this research given the multi-scalar layered conditionings in the new context, it needs to be taken 
in consideration with a planning perspective, not in an isolated fashion as it has been done in 
financial and legal terms. This intersectional and multi-scalar approach can be a catalyst in order 
to pull back the efforts towards a strong political local governance—planning is the way. 
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Furthermore, reactivating the Planning Board to encourage a development plan at the regional 
level and in turn at the community level creates an opportunity to delegate other resources and 
develop in a more robust way mechanisms for financialization, achieving a multi-scalar 
economic model. Finally, it strengthens the scenario of inter-municipal collaboration by means of 
achieving equity and social justice. Consequently, perhaps strengthening and reinvigorating the 
public sector ethos that once Puerto Rico had. 
6.4 Austerity Measures by Debt Restructuring at the Municipal Level 
Austerity regimes are not “new politics.” In other words, given the literature review austerity 
measures became a mainstream prescriptions for countries that were not performing well or at 
(presumed) risk of default. In general terms, the permanent public deficits, the inefficient, 
corruption schemes, the untrustworthy public accounting practices, and the economies in 
recession are a common thread. Austerity programs formally target excessive public debt and this 
directly affects public services through spending cuts. Therefore, public services bear the most 
significant consequences of austerity policies not withstanding the already vulnerable population. 
Services management and delivery are pair up within the rationale of austerity since it has 
involve freezing of spending, up and down scaling roles and programs, quality requirements in 
combination with new institutional and supra-visions in the background. All circumstances 
which has been currently unfolding in Puerto Rico the past years. 
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As Crispian Fuller points out austerity is an “important feature of urban society” (Fuller, 2017), 
he further claims that cities become the locus of mediation of “austerity urbanism” (Peck, 2012, 
p. 2). In the case of Puerto Rico is palpable that municipalities are an interwoven site for most of 
the tendencies of the current pressures, where such a process of fiscal restructuring, post-disaster 
reconstruction, economic decline, population change, and local deliberation make the formulated 
austerity program and the production of consensus highly problematic. The overlapping troubles 
involving economic performance, banks, fiscal decline, political barriers and structural 
inequalities creates a condition that public policies, rules of the government and society at large, 
economic and urban planning should be considered equally and permanently to address the long 
time trajectory looming for Puerto Rico.  Based on the above, a new manner of dealing with 
traditional government services and policy approaches is required. One can argue that in order to 
achieved a specific social/public services objectives there will be the need to secure at least six 
areas: education, institutional, physical, cultural, environmental and participatory logics, non 
which are as main considerations when revising official documents. Such a granular and 
interdisciplinary understanding is not being discuss at the present. 
Policies and restructuring emerge from the bargaining between “a network of members” (Rhode,
2006) that is to say that this governmental and financial shift have left local government’s and 
their apparent role in a confusion state. As a result of the little constitutional protection that 
municipal authorities have when compared to the central government which retains considerable 
control and financial powers. However, the FOMB has the ultimate saying suppressing evermore 




Finding that the roles and structures under which municipalities operate lead to a contradicting, 
inconsistent and in general becoming a national target, serves as a possible explanation that 
services provided by this locus are in fact becoming highly vulnerable. Against a background of 
tight spending allocations and the increasing proposed mechanism of privatization via multiple 
angles (resiliency, PPP, reconstruction and technology innovation) marks down  the means of 
weakening structural and financial support systems for public services at large. The emergence of  
new actors and the potential expansion of networks of actors involved in public services adds to 
the complexity of governance structure. Since Puerto Rico’s governing model is currently 
shifting it is a valuable effort to keep these identified tendencies on sight since many of the 
interviews mentioned that the situation is unfolding as this research is done. The literature review 
of austerity regimes concludes that the greater the time and space under these measures the more 
heavy the influence of the phenomenon has on the territory (Wollmann, Koprić, & Marcou, 
2016). PROMESA was enacted on 2016 and the last fiscal plan stipulates 2024 as projected 
goals. It is to be noted that this timeline has been placed upon PuertoRico until the island obtains 
two status: balanced budgets and regains access to the financial market–this is, to get more 
indebted.   
“Austerity affects the political responsiveness of the governors and the expectations of the 
governed” (Lippi & Tsekos, 2019, p.6). The imposition of the FOMB created stronger disparities 
between intergovernmental relations. The leaders of both the Federation and the Association of 
Mayors have to reevaluate their responsibilities, structures, functions and finances and the most 
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practical measures to overcome the crisis. Given that before the crisis, more than half of the 
population lived below the poverty levels; and even with government subsidies, 36 of the 78 
municipalities operate with a budget deficit, and some are not self-sustaining. Again point out 
that the impact of this austerity program will indeed slay municipalities and their services. As a 
spin off, it also could be thought that 40 municipalities stand strong enough to jumpstart the 
shared services and explore the tax-based sharing mechanism, that not even in the United States 
has been explored despite local governance challenges. 
6.5 Puerto Rico’s Colonial Legacy 
The colonial history of Puerto Rico has left as legacy some political institutions and governing 
practices that are difficult to unravel. The roots of Puerto Rico’s problem are much more deeply 
linked to the past that many observers, foreigners, professional consultants and even politicians 
are willing to recognized and address. The structural inequalities are palpable through many 
disciplines. Nevertheless, Urban Planning has serve as form to exercise and spur unequal 
grounds and gaps that still prevail in the present. Carving automatically space for the discipline 
and practitioner to undo their demons. Thus far the restructure plan overlooks completely and 
neglects the island’s legacy of the colonial condition that still manifest throughout its legal 
framework, political practices and territorial thinking. Furthermore, the existing conditions and 
imperative state of social despair after the hurricane still has not been solved—the reconstruction 
funds haven’t been fully disbursed. The FOMB nor the central government have not been able to 
address social economic burdens even though they assumed that this is being handled through “a 
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purely economic and financial lens”— a political problem address through technocratic means. It 
self repeating the same mistakes, recipes, experiments and injustice as in the recent-past history. 
6.6 [Un]natural Disaster 
Hurricanes and their impacts can be understood not only as natural disasters but as unnatural 
manmade disasters. Irma and Maria revealed the underlying conditions of infrastructure in 
Puerto Rico, including the delivery of public services. The inaction or faulty measures define the 
“unatural” aspect where deaths, damages and emergency management are the result of human 
acts or their omission. The disastrous shake-up made more apparent that a transformation was 
taking place in the way public utilities were managed, prioritized, and governed. As Daniel 
Farber (2018) claims “Hurricane María led to the biggest failure of American disaster response 
since Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in 2005.” This author 
emphasizes that the situation created by the passage of Hurricane Maria proves a serious failure 
with the fulfillment that a nation has towards its citizens through Disaster Law and Policy, a field 
that bridges to the planning practice. This situation can also be looked with an economic lens 
since different lenses tend to sharpen the understanding from other disciplines. In the 2010 World 
Development Report, a report that looks to direct effects on hazards estimates that increase in 
damage associated with tropical cyclone activity as a result of climate change is between $28 
billion and $68 billion annually by 2100 (World Bank, 2010). These effects are likely to 
concentrate in the Caribbean in particular already vulnerable territories. In hindsight, since 
Puerto Rico operates under unequal circumstances at the political and economic level by it 
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dependency in the U.S. this marks deeper complications into the future if it is not reframed 
within international projections. It can be argue that successful policy response for effective 
mitigation and prevention has to include trustworthy information, direct intervention and 
reassessing infrastructure. Reinforcing a structural shift along with proactive response from 
governments and both public and private institutions.   
6.7 Opportunities 
Urban Planning at its core potentiates human impact. Considering that austerity effects can 
remain invisible if only treated within a limited scope, scale, structure or governing power, this 
study was done with the interest of triangulating conditions that emerged around Puerto Rico’s 
unique moment of reconstruction, in order to seek a better understatement of the waves of crisis, 
restructuring, and austerity in the course for the municipalities, specifically their provision of 
services. What is missing in Puerto Rico’s newer context is the attempt to address the delivery of 
services through urban planning. The solutions to address these multilayered and multi-scale 
challenges need to be devise under planning terms. Perhaps too much for this study to actually 
address, but in it is a clear discussion of a possible path of action for the municipalities’ role to be 
redefine and transformed in critical agents that protect and deliver the public services to 
everyone, but mostly to their disadvantaged population. What we have here is the opportunity to 
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